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THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME:
WHY THE HARM STANDARD IN GRANDPARENT

VISITATION DISPUTES IS IN THE CHILD'S BEST
INTERESTS
Lauren F. Cowan*
"In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds
between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however,
our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an
intergenerational relationship would be beneficial
in any specific case is
1
for the parent to make in the first instance."
INTRODUCTION

Barbara and Victor Genco lost their son Peter on September 11, 2001,
and now they face losing their grandchildren as well. 2 Following the death
of their son, the Gencos' relationship with their daughter-in-law became
strained, and she refused to let the Gencos see their grandchildren. 3 Soon
after, the Gencos petitioned the court to order visitation time with their
grandchildren. 4 The daughter-in-law submitted court documents against the
petition alleging abuse and neglect, including drinking in front of and
striking the girls. 5 In 2003, the Nassau County Family Court issued an
order granting supervised visitation of four hours per month. 6 The
daughter-in-law has since requested that the monthly visitation end. 7 Thus,
the legal battle rages on, drawing out a bitter dispute and preventing all
parties from moving on with their lives.
While the Gencos' situation is certainly the exception, 8 it is not
uncommon. 9 There are many situations where parents may object to
grandparental relationships with their children. Such conflicts typically
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to extend profound
appreciation to Professor James Fleming for his insightful comments and suggestions
throughout the editing process, and to Ben and my family for their infinite love and support.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000).
2. Paul Vitello, For 9/11 Families, New Sorrow in Fight Over Grandchildren,N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 2007, at Al.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.

9. A 9/11 mediator said that "1 in 10 of his cases involved estranged grandparents." Id.
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arise after a change in family circumstances:
Death in the family,
incarceration, divorce, and drug abuse are common events that change the
family dynamic and lead to visitation disputes.' 0 The father could pass
away, and the mother might cut off visitation with the paternal grandparents
because she does not want her children to be exposed to the grandparents'
worldview. Or the mother could be in rehabilitation for drug abuse, and the
father could deny visitation rights to the maternal grandparents because he
never particularly liked them. In many cases, parents do not altogether
deny visitation rights, but seek to decrease the frequency of visitation. 1
In Troxel v. Granville, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the right of
grandparents to seek visitation time with their grandchildren. 12 At issue
was a Washington statute which granted visitation to grandparents if the
court determined that it would be in the child's best interests. 13 The
plurality found the Washington statute unconstitutional as applied because
the trial court did not employ the presumption that fit parents act in the best
interests of their child. 14 The plurality was clear that a best interests
15
standard-without more-gives insufficient protection to parental rights.
However, the plurality did not decide the appropriate standard to guide
courts and legislatures in the future. 16
This Note addresses Troxel's remaining question: What standard should
legislatures adopt and courts apply to grandparent visitation to comply with
Troxel's constitutional mandate? Part I recounts the history of grandparent
visitation rights and the emergence of competing standards that courts apply
when evaluating visitation disputes. Part II discusses the two main
competing standards: the "best interests plus" standard and the harm
standard. Part III argues that legislatures should adopt the harm standard
instead of the currently prevailing "best interests plus" standard and that
courts should interpret statutes with "best interests" language to require a
showing of harm.

10. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-61 (2000) (dealing with a visitation dispute
that arose after the death of one parent); M.S. v. D.C., 763 So. 2d 1051, 1051-52 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (dealing with a visitation dispute that arose after the incarceration of one
parent); Steward v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777, 778 (Nev. 1995) (dealing with a visitation
dispute that arose after the divorce of parents); Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 206-07
(N.J. 2003) (dealing with a visitation dispute that arose after the drug overdose and death of
one parent).
11. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61 (dealing with a parent who limited grandparent
visitation to once per month); Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 877 (Pa. 2006) (dealing with a
parent who limited grandparent visitation to three times in one year).
12. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 67-69 ("The problem here is ... [that] it gave no special weight at all to
Granville's determination of her daughters' best interests.").
15. See id.

16. Id. at 73 ("[W]e do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the
Washington Supreme Court-whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental
visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition
precedent to granting visitation.").

2007]

THERE'S NO PLA CE LIKE HOME

3139

I. GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS BEFORE AND AFTER TROXEL

A. Grandparent Visitation Disputes
Historically, grandparents did not have a right to sue when they were
denied visitation time with their grandchildren. 17 Today, however,
grandparents have standing to sue for visitation time with grandchildren in
all fifty states.1 8 This section will briefly discuss the history of grandparent
visitation rights and the question of whose rights are really at stake when a
dispute about grandparent visitation arises.
1. General History
Over the past few decades, the nature of the American family has
changed dramatically. 19 As women entered the work force and the divorce
rate escalated,20 the traditional notion of the stable, nuclear family
dissipated.2 1 Families attempted to regroup in a variety of ways. Often,
Americans relied on extended family networks to maintain or regain a sense
of family or belonging. 22 Frequently, in the event of a divorce or a death in
the family, grandparents have increased their role in their grandchildren's
lives to foster a sense of normalcy and security for the children.2 3
17. See Naomi Karp, Introduction to Grandparent Visitation Disputes: A Legal
Resource Manual 1, 1 (Ellen C. Segal & Naomi Karp eds., 1989) [hereinafter Grandparent
Visitation Disputes].
18. Ellen C. Segal & Jody George, State Law on GrandparentVisitation: An Overview
of CurrentStatutes, in Grandparent Visitation Disputes, supra note 17, at 5, 5.
19. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63-64; see also Economic and Statistics Admin., U.S. Census
Bureau, 1997:
Population Profile of the United States 27 (1998), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p23-194.pdf (noting the increase in children living
with only one parent); Rose M. Kreider & Jason M. Fields, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 1996, at 16, 18 (2002), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Marriages and
Divorces] (noting the increase in the divorce rate); Terry A. Lugaila, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1998 (Update), at i (1998),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p20-514.pdf (noting that four million
grandchildren now live with their grandparents); Oliver G. Hahn, Note, Grandparent
Visitation in the Face of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause: Parental or
GrandparentalRights? Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L.
Rev. 199, 204-07 (2001).
20. See U.S. Marriages and Divorces, supra note 19, at 16, 18. The divorce rate has
since leveled off and even showed a slight decline. See Robert E. Emery et al., Divorce
Mediation: Research and Reflections, 43 Fam. Ct. Rev 22, 23 (2005).
21. See Jennifer Kovalcik, Note, Troxel v. Granville:
In the Battle Between
Grandparent Visitation Statutes and Parental Rights, "The Best Interest of the Child"
StandardNeeds Reform, 40 Brandeis L.J. 803, 803 (2002).
22. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 7.
23. See Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 895 (Pa. 2006); Segal & George, supra note 18,
at 7; Jacquelyn E. Avin, Note, GrandparentVisitation: The One and Only Standard-Best
Interests of the Child: Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993), 24 U. Balt.
L. Rev. 211, 215 (1994) (noting that grandparents have a "nurturing relationship" with
grandchildren, which is "especially important to a child when divorce divides the nuclear
family").
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Parents typically support their children spending time with
grandparents. 24 There are circumstances, however, where parents object to
grandparent visitation. 25 At common law, grandparents were without
recourse since most courts would not order visitation over a parent's
26
objection.
The rationale for the common law rule was explained as follows: the
parent's obligation to allow grandparent visitation is moral not legal; a
judicial award of visitation would hinder parental authority; forcing the
child into the center of conflict between grandparent and parent is
contrary to the child's best interests; and, natural ties, 27not judicial
intervention, are the best means of restoring family harmony.
The common law rule no longer applies. Between 1965 and 1988, every
state legislature enacted a grandparent visitation statute 28 in recognition of
the changing American family. 29 The statutes vary as to who has standing
to petition for visitation, when a person may petition,
and what standard
30
courts should apply in considering visitation claims.
Most state statutes require a disturbance in the traditional family
relationship before a grandparent may have standing to sue. 31 Statutes
commonly grant standing to a grandparent if visitation is restricted or
denied after the child's parents divorce, one parent dies, or if the child
previously lived with the grandparent. 3 2 Incarceration and drug abuse are
also common events that change the family dynamic and lead to disputes
over visitation. 33 A few states
allow grandparents to petition for visitation
34
when the family is still intact.
24. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Grandparent Visitation: Best Interests Test Is Not in
Child's Best Interests, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. 724, 726 (2000) ("[Plarents can allow contact,
and they usually do, when they feel it is beneficial to the child. Ordinarily parents do not
need to be required by a court to allow the child to visit with the grandparents.").
25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
26. See Karp, supra note 17, at 1.
27. Naomi Karp, Recent Case Law on GrandparentVisitation, in Grandparent Visitation
Disputes, supra note 17, at 23, 24.
28. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 5.
29. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) ("Because grandparents and other
relatives undertake duties of a parental nature in many households, States have sought to
ensure the welfare of the children therein by protecting the relationships those children form
with such third parties."); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 576 n.l (Tenn. 1993)
(recognizing that grandparent visitation statutes were "undoubtedly the product of the
nation-wide increase in the number of families broken by divorce"); see also N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Law § 72, ch. 657, § 1 (McKinney Supp. 2007) (historical and statutory notes section)
(recognizing that there are "413,000 children living in grandparent headed households in
New York state," and that "grandparents play a special role in the lives of their
grandchildren and are increasingly functioning as care givers in their grandchildren's lives").
30. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 6-13 (explaining how all fifty state statutes
respond to each of these questions).
31. See id. at 9.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
34. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 8; see also R.K. v. A.J.B., 666 A.2d 215, 21617 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995) (noting that a "grandparent's right to visitation now
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Generally, a grandparent petitions the court by filling out an affidavit
explaining the situation and why it would be in the best interests of the
child to have visitation time with the grandparent. 35 Some state statutes
specify the court in which such petitions must be filed. 36 Once filed, a
judge reviews the petition and may order the parties to submit to
mediation, 37 issue a court order awarding visitation rights, or decide that a
38
trial should be held.

Procedural rules for grandparent visitation suits vary by state. Some state
statutes expressly allow modification of visitation orders. 39 Others provide
for counseling or mediation if one party is willing to pay for such
services. 40 A few states provide that the4petitioner
must pay attorneys' fees
1
if some element of good faith is missing.
2. Defining the Dispute: Whose Rights Are at Stake? Parental Versus
Grandparental Versus Children's
A central question in the debate over grandparent visitation is whose
rights are really at stake. Is it the parents' constitutional right to control the
upbringing of their children? Is it the children's right to have a meaningful
relationship with their grandparents? Is it the grandparents' statutory right

exists notwithstanding the integrity of the child's family unit"); Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577
N.E.2d 27, 28-29 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that a grandparent may demonstrate standing to
obtain visitation time with a grandchild who has a nuclear, intact family); Frances E. v. Peter
E., 479 N.Y.S.2d 319, 323 (Fain. Ct. 1984) (holding that a grandparent may seek visitation
rights with a grandchild who has an intact family).
35. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 5(E)(1) (West 2006) (vesting the court with
jurisdiction to grant visitation "upon the filing of a verified application for such visitation
rights"); Leonard L. Loeb, Suggestionsfor Counsel Representing Parents or Grandparents,
in Grandparent Visitation Disputes, supra note 17, at 49, 49 ("[G]randparents... may
simply petition the court for visitation ....).
36. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 405.021(2) (LexisNexis 1999) (stating that a petition
must be filed in circuit court); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-05.1 (2004) (stating that a petition
must be filed in district court in conjunction with a divorce proceeding or, if no divorce
proceeding has been instituted, as a civil action in the court of the county of residence of the
child).
37. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-103(g) (Supp. 2005) (discussing mediation); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 5(E)(2)-(3); see generally John M. Haynes, The Use of Mediation in
Grandparent Visitation Disputes, in Grandparent Visitation Disputes, supra note 17, at 79,
79.
38. See Marcia B. Gevers, Practice Tips for Attorneys Representing Grandparents, in
Grandparent Visitation Disputes, supra note 17, at 41, 44-46 (discussing grandparent
visitation petitions and trials).
39. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-103(f)(4)(C); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16-5 (West
1999); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1802(3) (2004).
40. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-103(g); see also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 5(E)(2)(3) (discussing mediation).
41. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 1804 (2006) (providing for fees if a party
fails to mediate in good faith); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 5(E)(6)(d), (E)(7), (H) (awarding
fees if the court sees fit); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6) to (7) (Supp. 2006) (allowing for fees
if a petition to modify a visitation order is denied, and the petition was not made in good
faith).
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to have a meaningful relationship with their grandchild? Or is it the state's
authority to promote the welfare of children?
The plurality in Troxel viewed the conflict as primarily between the
parents' constitutional right and the state's interest. 42 It did, however,
recognize that "children should have the opportunity to benefit from
relationships with statutorily specified persons-for example, their
grandparents." 43 The plurality's recognition of a child's interest did not go
as far as Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent, however, in which he argued
that a child has a right to a meaningful relationship with his or her
44
grandparents.
The Supreme Court has recognized that parental rights to the care of
children might extend beyond the nuclear family to grandparents in certain
circumstances. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, a grandmother
challenged the constitutionality of a zoning regulation that permitted only
certain family members to live together.45 The grandmother lived with her
two grandsons, who were related as cousins, not as brothers. 4 6 Their living
arrangement was prohibited by the statute. 4 7 Had the grandchildren been
related as brothers, the statute would have permitted such an arrangement. 48
The Court invalidated the statute on substantive due process grounds,
holding that it infringed on family privacy rights. 49 The Court further stated
that such privacy rights are not limited to the nuclear family,
acknowledging that grandparents often play a significant role in child50
rearing decisions.
Although the Court implied the extension of due process protection to the
grandparental relationship, the Court did not explicitly recognize that a
grandparent has a right to a meaningful relationship with a grandchild.
Further, any extension of due process protection may be limited to the facts
of the case. Moore did not involve grandparental rights pitted against
51
parental rights, but rather grandparental rights pitted against the state.
Thus, the facts did not implicate the traditionally protected parental due

42. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000).

43. Id. at 64.
44. See id. at 86-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice John Paul Stevens stated in his
dissent,
Cases like this do not present a bipolar struggle between the parents and the
State over who has final authority to determine what is in a child's best interests.
There is at a minimum a third individual, whose interests are implicated in every
case to which the statute applies-the child.
Id. at 86.
45. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-97 (1977).

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 496.
See id. at 497.
See id. at 496 n.2.
Id. at 504-06.
Id. at 505.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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process right. In visitation disputes, where
the parental interest is
52
paramount, Moore may not apply as forcefully.
Furthermore, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court refused to
extend the parental right of care, custody, and control of a child beyond the
marital family. 53 In that case, a married woman named Carole had an
extramarital affair with Michael H. that produced a child, Victoria. 54 Under
California law, Carole's then-husband Gerald was presumed to be
Victoria's father because the statute presumed the husband of the mother to
be the father of the child. 55 Michael H. challenged the law on substantive
due process grounds, arguing that the parental right to the custody of the
child extended to him as a biological parent. 56 The Court upheld the
statute, explaining that substantive due process rights, such as the parental
right over a child, derive from liberties that traditionally have been afforded
protection. 57 Michael H.'s relationship with Victoria, as the biological
58
father of an illegitimate child, was not traditionally protected.
Similarly, the grandparental relationship does not fit within the Michael
H. conception of the marital family and is not a relationship that
traditionally has been afforded protection. 59 American courts have never
explicitly recognized a grandparent's right to have a meaningful
relationship with a grandchild. Courts do recognize that a grandparent has
statutory rights to petition for visitation and to be granted visitation if the
relevant state statute standard is met. 60 However, no court has explicitly
recognized a grandparent's constitutional right to visit with his or her

52. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained the distinction between parental and
grandparental rights in the recent case, Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006). Justice
Max Baer explained that grandparental interests come into play only after parental rights
have been considered. Id. at 899. Further, he reiterated that grandparental rights are entitled
to "little weight." Id.
Although third-party interests, the so-called external factors, may then be
considered by the court only after resolving those interests that are fundamental.
Often, non-parents, especially grandparents, form an emotional bond with the
child. They may seek to perpetuate a continuing relationship with that child
through visitation. Although they may sometimes enjoy a protected interest in the
companionship of the child when standing in loco parentis, I agree that, within the
legal landscape, the interests of the grandparents are entitled to little weight in
comparison to the stronger interests of the parents and the children. Their greatest
consideration only enters into a determination of the child's best interests.
Id.
53. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
54. Id. at 113.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 119-21.
57. Id. at 123-24.
58. Id. at 124.
59. The Court in Michael H. explained that only Gerald D., Carole, and Victoria were
within the marital family. Id. at 124.
60. See Joan Catherine Bohl, Grandparent Visitation Law Grows Up: The Trend
Toward Awarding Visitation Only When the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48 Drake
L. Rev. 279, 316-17 (2000) (explaining that courts treat "grandparent visitation [as] a purely
statutory right").
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grandchild. 6 1 Even Stevens's dissent in Troxel notes that the battle over
grandparent visitation includes only three parties: the state, the parent, and
the child. 62 In fact, a Georgia appellate court has even stated that courts
should not consider the interests of grandparents in determining visitation
63
awards.
It is ironic that much of the discussion over grandparent visitation is
cloaked in the phrase "grandparent visitation rights," even though no court
has specifically held that a grandparent has a right to visit with a
grandchild. When discussing this topic, it is important to separate the
language of rights from the substance of whose rights are actually at stake.
This Note proceeds with two competing interests in mind: the parent's and
64
the state's.
B. Development of the Best Interests Standard
Part L.A discussed the emergence of grandparent visitation rights and the
rights that a court must examine when hearing a visitation dispute. In
addition to sorting out whose rights are at stake, courts must also determine
which substantive standard to apply. Part I.B explains the development and
application of the best interests standard to visitation disputes.
The standard governing parental rights concerning their children has
undergone many transformations. Early American law viewed children as
65
the property of their fathers, and gave full custody rights to fathers.
Children and fathers had mutual obligations: Fathers had to support their
children, and children had to give all of their earnings to their father. 66 This
view of child custody changed as a result of advocacy efforts in the early
twentieth century. 67 Reformers argued that it unfairly denied mothers
custody of their children. 68 In response to such advocacy, legislatures and
courts adopted the tender years presumption, which gave custody to the
61. The only language even implying that a grandparent might have rights regarding his
or her grandchild is in Justice Anthony Kennedy's dissent in Troxel. Justice Kennedy argues
that, where a grandparent has a substantial relationship with the child, the grandparent
thereby attains a right vis-A-vis the parent. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S 57, 99-101
(2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
63. "'[A]ny detrimental impact to the grandparents through the loss of visitation
opportunities with a grandchild, whether due to the death or divorce of a child's parents,
relocation of the family, or other unfortunate circumstances, is irrelevant to the court's
determination of whether or not to grant visitation rights to the grandparents."' Luke v.
Luke, 634 S.E.2d 439, 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Hunter v. Carter, 485 S.E.2d 827
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997)), cert. denied, No. S06C2088, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 867 (Oct. 16, 2006).
64. This does not mean that the child's interest is disregarded. Rather, this Note will
argue that the child's interest is best effectuated by deferring to parental decision making.
See infra notes 321-30 and accompanying text.
65. See Mary Kate Keamey, The New Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking at Parents
With a Loving Eye, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 543, 547 (1996).
66. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support
Enforcement, and FatherlessChildren, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 325, 333 (2005).
67. See Keamey, supra note 65, at 547-48.

68. See id. at 547.
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mother as long as she were deemed fit to care for the child. 69 The tender
years presumption is based on the belief that a child's primary need is his or
her mother's love and care, and that mothers are better able than fathers to
fulfill these needs. 70 During the middle of the twentieth century, reformers
again argued for a new standard. They maintained that the tender years
presumption violated both procedural due process and the Equal Protection
71
Clause by excluding men from equal consideration in custody disputes.
A gender-neutral standard soon materialized 72 when legislatures and
courts adopted the best interests of the child standard. 73 The standard
requires courts to determine custody based on which placement (the mother
or the father) would be in the best interests of the child, without any
preconceived notions based on the parent's sex. It was not until 1965 that
state legislatures imported this standard to the grandparent visitation
context. 74 Beginning in 1965, most states enacted grandparent visitation
statutes that adopted the best interests standard. Courts applied the best
interests language to the facts of specific cases and, in so doing, gave
75
meaning to the standard.
Some courts developed multi-factor tests to determine what was in a
child's best interests. New Jersey's pre-Troxel grandparent visitation
statute included the following list of factors:
(1) The relationship between the child and the applicant; (2) The
relationship between each of the child's parents or the person with whom
the child is residing and the applicant; (3) The time which has elapsed
since the child last had contact with the applicant; (4) The effect that such
visitation will have on the relationship between the child and the child's
parents or the person with whom the child is residing; (5) If the parents
are divorced or separated, the time sharing arrangement which exists
between the parents with regard to the child; (6) The good faith of the
applicant in filing the application; (7) Any history of physical, emotional
or sexual abuse or neglect by the applicant;
and (8) Any other factor
76
relevant to the best interests of the child.
69. See id. at 548; Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child
Custody, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 615, 619-20 (1992).
70. See Keamey, supra note 65, at 548.
71. See id. at 549; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 75 (Alaska 1977);
Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1380 (D.C. 1978); Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285,
287-88 (Fam. Ct. 1973) (rejecting the tender years doctrine because the best interests of the
child are effectuated without "sex preconceptions of any kind").
72. See Keamey, supra note 65, at 549.
73. This standard first emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century. See Jill Elaine
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 825, 849 (2004). However, it was not
widely used in custody disputes until the middle of the twentieth century. See Kearney,
supra note 65, at 549.
74. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 5-8.
75. For an example of an early case that gave meaning to the best interests standard, see
Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 355 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that animosity between the
child's parents and grandparents is not determinative in the analysis of what is in the best
interests of the child).
76. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-7.1 (West 2002).
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One Massachusetts family law judge described the factors he used to
determine a child's best interests as follows:
(1) Can the grandparents provide a safe, responsible and satisfactory
atmosphere for the proposed visit? (2) What is the history of grandparent
visitation in the past? (3) Is the child emotionally stable? Physically
healthy? (4) Are the grandparents physically and emotionally equipped
for handling visitation? (5) Is there an earnest desire on the part of the
grandparents and the grandchild to have a meaningful visitation
relationship? Or are the visits
requested for any other reason? (6) What
77
are the wishes of the child?
Courts do not have expertise in the social development of children, so
they often defer to experts, such as social scientists, on what is in the best
interests of the child. 78 These experts "supply [courts] with up-to-date
scientific concepts of proper child raising' that they might apply in judging
and, where possible, rehabilitating parents who fall 'below acceptable
standards. '79 Usually, these experts are social workers or psychologists
who can testify to the developmental needs of children. 80 Sometimes, it is
necessary to have a court-appointed psychologist evaluate all the parties to
the dispute to determine what is in the best interests of the child. 8 1
C. Troxel and the Emergence of the "Best Interests Plus" Standard
Part I.B explained the development and application of the best interests
standard. Part I.C discusses the Supreme Court decision in Troxel v.
Granville and the death knell of the best interests standard. This section
then explains the new standards that emerged out of Troxel to replace the
best interests standard.
For three decades, most states applied the best interests standard to
visitation disputes without hesitation. 82 In 2000, the Supreme Court altered
the terrain of grandparent visitation disputes with its decision in Troxel.83
At issue in Troxel was a sweeping grandparent visitation statute that
allowed "any person" to seek visitation "at any time" and granted such
visitation if it would "serve the best interest[s] of the child."'84

77. Ernest Rotenberg, Guidancefor Judges Hearing Grandparent Visitation Cases, in
Grandparent Visitation Disputes, supra note 17, at 71, 73.
78. See Dana Mack, The Assault on Parenthood 84 (1997).
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. See Gevers, supra note 38, at 43.
81. See id.
82. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 11-12 (noting that forty-one states used the
best interests standard and the remaining states used variations thereof).

83. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
84. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.10.160(3) (West 2005) ("Any person may petition
the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings.
The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best
interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.").
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Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel lived together with their two children
until the couple separated in 1991.85 After the separation, Brad regularly
86
brought the children to the home of his parents, Jenifer and Gary Troxel.
8
7
Shortly thereafter, Brad committed suicide.
For a short time, Tommie
allowed the children to continue to visit the Troxels, but a few months later,
she notified the Troxels that she wished to limit visitation to once per
month. 88 The Troxels petitioned for increased visitation rights under
Washington's visitation statutes. 89 Specifically, they requested "two
weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks of visitation
90
each summer."
1. Plurality, Concurrences, and Dissents
Over six years of litigation ensued until the case finally reached the
Supreme Court in January 2000. The Supreme Court issued six different
opinions and did not lend much clarity to the dispute. The plurality 9 ' found
that the Washington statute unconstitutionally infringed on the
"fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children." 92 The plurality discussed a long line
of substantive due process cases that establish
a parent's right to direct the
93
way in which his or her child is raised.
One such case is Meyer v. Nebraska, where the Supreme Court held that
a Nebraska statute forbidding the teaching of foreign languages to a child
94
before he or she reaches the eighth grade violates the Due Process Clause.
The Court reasoned that "liberty" in the Due Process Clause was not limited
to bodily restraint, but rather includes the right to "marry, establish a home
and bring up children." 95 Parents have a fundamental right to control the
education of their children under the Due Process Clause, and the Nebraska
statute unconstitutionally infringed on that right. 96 The plurality in Troxel
also discussed Pierce v. Society of Sisters,97 where the Court struck down a
law requiring children to attend public rather than private schools. 98 The
Court held that parents have the "liberty... to direct the upbringing and

85. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 60-61.
89. Id. at 61.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 59. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
and joined by then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Justice Stephen Breyer.
92. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
93. See id. at 65-66.
94. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 400.
97. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
98. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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education of [their] children," and the statute at issue violated that
fundamental right in an attempt to "standardize its children." 99 The
plurality in Troxel used these cases and their progeny as the basis for
striking down the trial court's application of the Washington statute.
The plurality determined that the statute was unconstitutional as applied
for two reasons. First, the statute was overly broad in that any person could
petition for visitation at any time.10 0 Such a sweeping statute subjects
parental decision making to court review at the whim of any third party. Io'
Second, the trial court failed to give any special weight to Tommie's (the
parent's) decision regarding visitation. 10 2 The trial court judge viewed the
mother, Tommie, and the grandparents, the Troxels, on equal footing, and,
in fact, placed the burden on Tommie to disprove that visitation would be in
the child's best interests. 103 The plurality stated that fit parents are
presumed to act in the best interests of their children. 1°4 Accordingly, the
decisions of fit parents regarding visitation should be given some level of
06
deference.10 5 Because the Troxels did not allege that Tommie was unfit,1
the trial court erred by not according special weight to her decision.
Ultimately, the plurality found in0 7favor of Tommie Granville, denying
increased visitation to the Troxels. 1
Justice David Souter's concurrence would have found the statute
unconstitutional on its face. 10 8 Souter explained that the statute's "any
person," "any time" provisions swept too broadly. 10 9 Those provisions
infringed on the parent's right to control the child's upbringing by

99. Id. at 534-35.
100. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 69.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 68.
105. Id. at 68-69.
106. Id. at 68. Fitness is a vague term that is defined differently by many courts and
legislatures. Generally, fitness means that a parent can adequately care for his or her child
and carry out regular caretaking responsibilities. For a specific definition of unfitness, see
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 5(D)(2)(b) (West 2006) (stating that fitness "includes, but is
not limited to, a showing that a parent ... (1) has a chemical or alcohol dependency, for
which treatment has not been sought or for which treatment has been unsuccessful, (2) has a
history of violent behavior or domestic abuse, (3) has an emotional or mental illness that
demonstrably impairs judgment or capacity to recognize reality or to control behavior, (4)
has been shown to have failed to provide the child with proper care, guidance and support to
the actual detriment of the child ... or (5) demonstrates conduct or condition which renders
him or her unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care. Reasonable parental
care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provides nurturing and protection adequate to
meet the child's physical, emotional and mental health").
107. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
108. Justice David Souter's opinion makes the four-justice plurality the operative opinion.
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds ... " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
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subjecting the parent to the judge's choice of a child's associations "merely
because the judge might think himself more enlightened than the child's
parent."' 10 Implicit in Souter's argument is the assumption that the right to
control the upbringing of a child includes the right to determine a child's
personal associations. I1l
Without the consequent right to determine
visitation,2 the parent's right to control a child's upbringing would be a
"sham.""II
According to Souter, the statute's overbreadth was sufficient
reason to strike it down, and the Court did not need to assess whether best
13
interests or harm was the appropriate standard.'
Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence also recognized the parent's
fundamental right to control the upbringing of his or her child. 14 Thomas
stated that the parent's fundamental right "resolves this case." 15 To him, it
was a clear-cut fundamental rights case, where the state's interest in
"Second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation" was not
compelling."16 The state's interest, however, was in promoting the best
interests of the child. Thomas's argument may imply that he would not
deem promotion of the best interests of the child to be a compelling state
interest.
Justice Stevens' dissent explained that he would have abstained from
granting certiorari because the Washington state legislature simply had to
"draft a better statute.""11 7 Having granted certiorari, however, Stevens
disagreed with the plurality's approach. 1 8 First, he noted that there were
many situations in which the statute could have been validly applied, such
as visitation granted to prior caregivers and foster care situations, and that
those situations justified upholding the statute. 119 Wherever there is a
"plainly legitimate sweep," Stevens wrote, "a facial challenge should
fail."' 120 Second, as noted above, Stevens focused on a third interest that the
majority sidestepped: the child's.' 2 ' He noted that while the parent's right
is paramount, it is not absolute. 122 When a child has developed a "familial
or family-like" relationship that serves "her welfare and protection," the
child has an interest in preserving that relationship. 123
In such
circumstances, the parent's right may be outweighed by that of the child.
Accordingly, Justice Stevens would have upheld the statute and the trial
court's application of it.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 79.
For further discussion of this right, see Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1999).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 76-77.

114. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 80-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 81.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at85.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 86.
Id. at 86, 88.
Id. at 88.
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Justice Anthony Kennedy's dissent recognized that the best interests
standard may sometimes provide insufficient protection to parental rights,
but nevertheless refused to facially invalidate it or to adopt a harm
standard. 124 He reasoned that case law and history do not establish as
fundamental the right to be free from state interference in the visitation
context. 125 Further, he noted that the best interests standard has been
21 6
universally adopted in most child-related family law proceedings.
Despite weaknesses in the best interests standard, the Constitution neither
forbids its application nor requires the harm standard. 127 The best
approach, he argued, would be to uphold the best interests standard and
require that courts apply it carefully.' 28 The constitutionality of the
approach would depend on the specific
facts of the case and how the
29
reviewing court analyzed the facts. 1
Justice Antonin Scalia was the sole Justice to argue that parents are not
guaranteed freedom from state intervention in raising their children. 130 He
refused to extend the parental rights recognized in earlier cases to this
context. 3 1 Finally, he argued that this issue should be left to 3 state
2
legislatures because courts should not recognize unenumerated rights. 1
It is important to note that all of the Justices, except for Scalia,
recognized that a parent has a constitutional right to the care, custody, and
control of his orher child. Scalia recognized this right as well, 133
but would
not base it in the Constitution; thus, it is unenforceable by courts.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 100.
Id. at 99.
See id. at 98.
Id. at 100-01.
Id.
Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at92.
Id. at93.
Id. at 91. Justice Scalia stated,
In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among
the "unalienable Rights" with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims
"all Men... are endowed by their Creator." And in my view that right is also
among the "othe[r] [rights] retained by the people" which the Ninth Amendment
says the Constitution's enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to deny or
disparage." The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription
conferring powers upon the courts; and the Constitution's refusal to "deny or
disparage" other rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even
further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to
enforce the judges' list against laws duly enacted by the people. Consequently,
while I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative
democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or
in electoral campaigns, that the State has no power to interfere with parents'
authority over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that the power which
the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to
laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.
Id. at 91-92.
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2. The Aftermath of Troxel: States' Responses
a. "Best Interests Plus" Standard
Following Troxel, visitation statutes must protect the parent's right to
control the upbringing of the child. It is unclear, however, what language
statutes should employ to meet that constitutional mandate. 134 States
responded to this uncertainty in a variety of ways. In some states, the
legislature amended the relevant visitation statute to include substantive
language favoring parental rights. 135 In others, the legislature changed only
the procedural burden. 136 Despite different means, these approaches had
the same goal: to recognize that the best interests standard alone grants
insufficient protection to parental rights and, accordingly, to give greater
weight to parental rights. 13 7
This Note refers to these approaches
138
collectively as the "best interests plus" standard.
The revised Pennsylvania statute illustrates the first, substantive,
approach to increasing parental rights. The revised statute requires both
that visitation be in the best interests of the child and that visitation not
interfere with the parent-child relationship. 139 Rhode Island opted for the
second, procedural approach and tried to comply with Troxel by requiring
140
that the substantive burden be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Both of these statutes recognize that the best interests standard alone
insufficiently protects parental rights, and they add substantive or
procedural hurdles to increase that level of protection.
To understand how courts interpret the "best interests plus" standard, one
must look at how courts apply the standard to particular sets of facts. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's application of this standard in Hiller v.
Fausey illustrates the meaning of the standard. 14 1 In Hiller, a child grew

134. See Robyn L. Ginsberg, Comment, Grandparent Visitation Rights:
The
Constitutionality of New York's Domestic Relations Law Section 72 After Troxel v.
Granville, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 206, 212 (2001).
135. See, e.g., infra note 139 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text.
137. See Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 219 (N.J. 2003) ("[T]he leitmotif that runs
through those cases is that the best interests standard standing alone, will not survive a
constitutional challenge ....).
138. Coincidentally, one Delaware family court recently referred to Delaware's statutory
approach using "best interests plus" language. See C.J.W. v. C.M.H., No. CN03-07001, 2006
Del. Fain. Ct. LEXIS 23, at *2 (May 15, 2006).
139. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5311 (West 2001) ("[T]he parents or grandparents of the
deceased parent may be granted reasonable partial custody or visitation rights, or both, to the
unmarried child by the court upon a finding that partial custody or visitation rights, or both,
would be in the best interest[s] of the child and would not interfere with the parent-child
relationship.").
140. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(v) (2003) (requiring that the person seeking
visitation must rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the parent's
decision to deny visitation was reasonable).
141. Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006).
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very close to his maternal grandmother in the two years leading up to his
mother's death. 142 During these two years, the grandmother performed
most of the basic child care needs. 14 3 Upon the mother's death, however,
the father ceased the grandmother's visitation with the child except for three
times in a one-year period. 14 4 The grandmother petitioned for increased
145
visitation, and the trial court granted it.
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed the trial court's
determination, it noted that the trial court applied Troxel's requirement of
special weight to the father's determination. 14 6 The trial court also applied
the presumption that, as a fit parent, the father acted in the child's best
interests. 147 Next, the trial court looked at the extent of visitation the father
would allow if the court did not grant the visitation order and decided that it
was minimal. 14 8 Most importantly, the trial court asked whether visitation
would be in the best interests of the child. 149 The court's reasons for
deciding that it was in the best interests of the child are important. The trial
court noted that the "[g]randmother is warm and loving and has developed a
'longstanding, very close relationship' with [the] [c]hild, and that [the]
[c]hild enjoyed spending time with her, engaging in many activities with
her, and visiting with his many maternal relatives during the family
gatherings that occur during the court-ordered [visitation]."' 150 Further, the
child was having difficulty coping with the loss of his mother and "contact
with his mother's side of the family is highly beneficial emotionally for
15 1
[the] [c]hild."'
The language that the Hiller court used differs markedly from language
used by courts that apply the harm standard. 152 The harm standard is a
more stringent alternative to the "best interests plus" standard, requiring
grandparents to demonstrate not simply that visitation would be in the best
interests of the child, but that the absence of visitation would cause harm to
the child. 153 Under the "best interests plus" standard, courts use language
like beneficial and helpful, whereas under the harm standard, courts use
language like "actual emotional harm"' 154 and detriment.
After deciding that it would be in the best interests of the child, the trial
court asked the most important question under Pennsylvania's "best
interests plus" standard: Will the order of visitation interfere with the

142. Id. at 877.
143. Id.
144. Id.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 878.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See infra notes 165-95 and accompanying text.
See infra Part l.C.2.b.
See, e.g., infra notes 170, 179 and accompanying text.
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parent-child relationship? 155 This question is the essence of the best
interests plus standard post-Troxel because it gives the "special weight" to
parental rights that the Supreme Court discussed in Troxel. In Hiller, the
court found the grandmother to be credible when she promised not to
disparage the father in front of the child, and thus determined that visitation
would not hurt the parent-child relationship.' 56 Hiller shows that courts
apply the "best interests plus" standard by tipping the scale in favor of
parents by requiring that visitation not interfere with the parent-child
relationship. However, courts allow grandparents to tip the scale back in
their favor by showing that visitation would be "beneficial" or useful to the
child.
Finally, a concurrence in Hiller listed factors courts should use when
applying the "best interests plus" standard:
(1) the amount of disruption extensive visitation would cause in the
child's life; (2) the suitability of the grandparents' home with respect to
the amount of supervision received by the child; (3) the emotional ties
between the child and the grandparents; (4) the moral fitness of the
grandparents; (5) the distance between the child's home and the
grandparents' home; (6) the potential for the grandparents to undermine
the parent's general disciplining of the child as a result of visitation; (7)
whether the grandparents are employed and the responsibilities associated
with such employment; (8) the amount of hostility that exists between the
parent and the grandparents; and (9) the willingness of the grandparents to
accept the fundamental concept that the rearing of the child is the 157
parent's
responsibility and is not to be interfered with by the grandparents.
These factors emphasize the importance of stability in the parent-child
relationship and lend greater protection to it than the traditional best
interests standard. Such strong language is the direct result of Troxel's
mandate and serves as the "plus" in the "best interests plus" standard.
b. Harm Standard
Many states have interpreted Troxel to require even more than a "best
interests plus" approach. These states require that grandparents show that
the denial of visitation time would cause harm to the child. 158 Upon such a
showing of harm (and any other state specific requirements), some states
automatically award visitation time to grandparents. 159 Other states use the
harm standard only as a threshold test, whereby the next step is the best
interests analysis. 160 The logic is that the state may not intervene absent a
155. Hiller, 904 A.2d at 879.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 901-02 (Newman, J., concurring).
158. See Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 450 (Conn. 2002); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d
1271, 1275-77 (Fla. 1996); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579-80 (Tenn. 1993); Williams
v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (Va. 1998).
159. See, e.g., Roth, 789 A.2d at 450.
160. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 n.5 (Ga. 1995).
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showing of harm; but, once. the grandparents demonstrate potential harm,
the state may then intervene to determine if visitation would be in the
child's best interests. 16 1 Both approaches initially require that the
grandparents make out a showing of harm.
62
Five states have adopted the harm standard through statutory language. 1
163
Other states that employ the harm standard do so by court interpretation.
In other words, their statutes facially require only that visitation be in the
best interests of the child. State courts have interpreted that language, in
light of Troxel, to require a showing of harm. 164
In order to understand the meaning of the harm standard, it is important
to look at the way courts apply the standard to particular sets of facts. In
Moriarty v. Bradt, the Supreme Court of New Jersey examined a visitation
dispute under the harm standard. 165 In Moriarty, the parents divorced and
remarried other people, but the children continued to spend a lot of time
with the maternal grandparents. 166 The children's mother later died of a
drug overdose, and the father greatly limited visitation with the maternal
167
grandparents because he blamed them for his ex-wife's drug addiction.
The court explained that the grandparents must demonstrate harm to the
161. See id.
162. See Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-3 (2004) ("[T]he court may grant any grandparent of the
child reasonable visitation rights if the court finds the health or welfare of the child would be
harmed unless such visitation is granted, and if the best interests of the child would be served
by such visitation."); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.27b(4)(b) (West Supp. 2006) (requiring
a grandparent to show that the "parent's decision to deny grandparenting time creates a
substantial risk of harm to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health."); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 10, § 5(A)(1)(b) (West 2006) (requiring "a showing of parental unfitness or
unsuitability or that the child would suffer harm or potential harm without the granting of
visitation rights" in addition to finding visitation to be in the child's best interests); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-6-306(b)(1) (2005) ("[T]he court shall first determine the presence of a
danger of substantial harm to the child."); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433(2) (Vernon Supp.
2006) (requiring petitioner to demonstrate "that denial of possession of or access to the child
would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional well-being").
163. See Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 888 n.21 (Pa. 2006) (listing courts of some of
the states that require harm).
164. See, e.g., Roth, 789 A.2d 431 (requiring a showing of harm to the child and a
relationship similar to that of a parent with the child); Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203 (N.J.
2003) (requiring a showing of harm to the child before it will consider awarding visitation
ights). This approach reads a requirement of harm into the statute, thereby preserving its
constitutionality after Troxel. See Roth, 789 A.2d at 449-50. As the Supreme Court of
Connecticut explained in Roth:
We have the option simply to invalidate the statute. That course, however,
would leave adrift the significant interests of the children harmed by the loss of
visitation with a loved one, and would cause significant uncertainty concerning the
rights of, and the limitations upon those persons seeking visitation. Moreover,
such a decision would entail significant questions concerning the effect of the
invalidation of § 46b-59 upon related provisions of §§ 46b-56 and 46b-57.... We
therefore delineate a scheme consistent with the aforestated principles that will
allow the statute to continue to function within the bounds of the constitution.
Id. at 449.
165. Moriarty,827 A.2d 203.
166. Id. at 205-06.
167. Id. at 206-08.
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children absent visitation with them, at which point the court would then
68
consider what was in the children's best interests. 1
The court found that denying the grandparents visitation rights would
harm the children because the children previously had a very close
relationship with the grandparents, and they had no other way to stay
connected to the memory of their mother. 169 The grandparents presented
expert testimony that the children were devastated by the death of their
mother and that abruptly ending visitation with the grandparents would
cause severe psychological damage to the children. 170 The grandparents
further argued that, in their absence, the father might disparage the mother
to the children, and therefore the children's only source of information
about their mother would portray her as "evil.' 71' Accordingly, the court
upheld the visitation order. 172 The court's rationale helps clarify what
constitutes harm to the child. Here, the lack of connection with a deceased
parent and the consequent risk that the children will suffer psychologically
constitutes harm.
In Luke v. Luke, the children's mother and father divorced, but continued
to allow visitation with all grandparents. 17 3 The children spent every other
174
weekend with their paternal grandparents, developing a very close bond.
When the children's father went overseas on military duty, however, the
mother sought to limit the paternal grandparents' visitation.1 75 The mother
believed that the grandparents "shuffled" the children around too much, that
the children returned from visits emotionally distressed, and that the
grandmother may have slapped one of the children. 176 The Georgia
Supreme Court found that the denial of visitation would cause harm to the
children and awarded visitation rights to the paternal grandparents. 177 The
grandparents explained that "with the children's father now serving with the
U.S. Army, the children's ties with their paternal family would be virtually
destroyed without such visitation." 178 Further, the grandparents had
developed such an intense bond with the grandchildren that cutting off
visitation with the grandparents would cause the children "actual emotional
harm."' 179 Here, harm includes the sudden termination of a strong, personal
relationship and the threat of the children losing their memory of a parent.

168. See id. at 221-22.
169. Id. at 224-25, 227-28.
170. Id. at 227.
171. Id.

172. See id. at 228.
173. Luke v. Luke, 634 S.E.2d 439, 440 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, No.
S06C2088, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 867 (Oct. 16, 2006).
174. Id. at 440-41.
175. Id. at 441.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 443-44.
178. Id. at 440.
179. Id. at 442.
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In the case of In re Marriage of Howard, the Supreme Court of Iowa
addressed grandparent visitation for the second time post-Troxel.180 The
facts of Howard are as follows: A married couple had a daughter while
going through divorce proceedings.' 8 1
The paternal grandparents
(Howards) petitioned for visitation time fearing that the divorce decree
would not include grandparent visitation time. 182 The divorce decree did
not grant the Howards visitation time because their son (the father) was
given joint custody. 183 The court presumed that the Howards would see
their granddaughter by spending time with their son. 184 Their son later lost
custody, though, due to his failure to comply with a court-ordered drug
rehabilitation program.185 The Howards again petitioned for visitation, and
the mother decided to grant visitation to the Howards, so long as it was
supervised and minimal. 186 The Howards had four outings with the
187
granddaughter following this agreement, all supervised by the mother.
The mother then expressed that "she did not foresee a time" that she would
ever allow the Howards to have unsupervised visits with the
granddaughter, 8 8 so the Howards petitioned the court for formal visitation
89
rights for the third time. The trial court granted such rights.1
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed and denied visitation rights
to the Howards. 19 0 The court adopted the harm standard, and found that
lack of visitation with the Howards would not cause harm to the
grandchild. 191 It acknowledged that children could be harmed by denial of
visitation after a well-established relationship with the grandparents, but
found no such relationship. 192 The court implied that the Howards had not
developed a meaningful relationship with their grandchild, such that ending
visitation would damage the child's psyche.' 93 Without a pre-formed
relationship, there is no compelling interest that would justify court
intervention. 194 Merely denying a relationship with grandparents that
would be beneficial, but that has not yet been developed, does not constitute
harm. 19 5 This case demonstrates that it reaches the level of harm only if the
relationship was fully developed and meaningful prior to the denial of
visitation.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

In re Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2003).
Id. at 185.
See id.
See id.
See id.

185. Id.
186. Id. at 186.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 187.
190. Id. at 192.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id.

189-90.
191.
191-92.
190-91.
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II. TROXEL's REMAINING QUESTION
Part I of this Note recounted the history of grandparent visitation rights
and the impact of Troxel on various states' approaches. Part II discusses
the two competing standards that emerged out of Troxel: the "best interests
plus" standard and the harm standard. This discussion characterizes and
196
examines the arguments of those who support and oppose each standard.
A. The "Best Interests Plus" Standard
1. The "Best Interests Plus" Standard Effectuates the Intent of Legislatures
in Passing Visitation Statutes
From the 1960s through the 1980s, 19 7 state legislatures enacted
grandparent
visitation
statutes
to foster
grandparent-grandchild
relationships. 198
Legislatures recognized the importance of such
relationships, and sought to implement the broadest possible visitation
rights in order to nurture these relationships. 19 9 Although there is little
legislative history on these statutes,2 0 0 courts have recognized that the intent
of legislatures in enacting grandparent visitation statutes was to foster
20 1
grandparental relationships and to promote broad visitation rights.
The "best interests plus" standard best effectuates the legislative intent
behind visitation statutes. "Best interests plus" places a lesser burden on
20 2
grandparents seeking visitation rights than does the harm standard.
Rather than demonstrate harm, grandparents merely must show that
196. The purpose of Part II is to characterize arguments typically made that support and
undermine each standard. Not all of these arguments correspond with this Note's
conclusions. This Note addresses them only to clarify the benefits and problems associated
with each standard.
197. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 5-8.
198. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
200. See Phyllis C. Borzi, Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step
Closer to the Best Interests of the Child, 26 Cath. U. L. Rev. 387, 393 (1977) (explaining
that there is no legislative history on these statutes).
201. The plurality in Troxel explains that states enacted such statutes in recognition of the
increased role that grandparents were playing in children's lives and with a desire to protect
such relationships. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000). The plurality implies
that legislatures intended broad visitation rights by stating that legislatures recognized that
children should have close relationships with grandparents. See id.
The nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in
some part, to the States' recognition of these changing realities of the American
family. Because grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a parental
nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the welfare of the
children therein by protecting the relationships those children form with such third
parties. The States' nonparental visitation statutes are further supported by a
recognition, which varies from State to State, that children should have the
opportunity to benefit from relationships with statutorily specified persons-for
example, their grandparents.

Id.
202. See Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 451 (Conn. 2002).
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visitation is in the best interests of the child and typically prove one or two
other state statutory requirements (for example, that visitation will not harm
the parent-child relationship or that visitation will be in the child's best
interests by clear and convincing evidence).
Overall, "the statutory
standard of the best interest of the child is a much lower threshold than the
requirement of proving significant harm. '20 3 This leniency translates into
more frequent awards of grandparent visitation.
It is a long-standing principle of statutory interpretation that statutes
should be construed to effectuate the legislature's intent. 204 Proponents of
the "best interests plus" standard argue that, because the legislature
intended broad visitation rights and strong grandparental relationships, the
"best interests plus" standard should be applied. 20 5
2. The "Best Interests Plus" Standard Recognizes the Changing Family and
Need for Extended Family Networks
Over the past few decades, the nature of the American family changed
dramatically. 20 6 As women entered the workforce and the divorce rate
rose, 20 7 the traditional, nuclear family dissolved to a degree. 20 8 Many
single-parent households arose, and persons outside the nuclear family
helped to raise the children. 20 9 Grandparents frequently assumed this
position. 2 10 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recognized this
phenomenon in the mid- 1980s:
One of the frequent consequences, for children, of the decline of the
traditional nuclear family is the formation of close personal attachments
between them and adults outside of their immediate families.
Stepparents, foster parents, grandparents and other caretakers often form
close bonds and, in effect, become psychological parents to children
whose nuclear families are not intact . . . . It would be shortsighted
indeed, for this court not
to recognize the realities and complexities of
2 11
modem family life ....
The "best interests plus" standard is more likely than the harm standard
to preserve a grandparental relationship once formed. Even if a grandparent
participated actively in child rearing, as explained above, the grandparent's
203. Id.
204. See United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. 556, 565 (1845).
205. See Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 890 (Pa. 2006) (stating that adopting the harm
standard "would set the bar too high, vitiating the purpose of the statute and the policy
expressed in [the statute], which is to assure the continued contact between grandchildren
and grandparents"); Brief for the American Association of Retired Persons and Generations
United as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3-19, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000) (No. 99-138) [hereinafter Brief for the AARP and Generations United].
206. See supra note 19-20 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 19-20 and accompanying text.
208. See Karp, supra note 17, at 1.
209. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000).
210. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977).
211. Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478, 481 (N.H. 1985).
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role in the child's life is not secure because the parent can challenge the
grandparent visitation. The "best interests plus" standard makes it slightly
easier for grandparents to maintain a relationship with grandchildren despite
a parent's challenge to the visitation. 2 12 This leniency recognizes
grandparents' increasing role in children's lives213and protects the
relationship that children form with their grandparents.
3. The "Best Interests Plus" Standard More Likely Allows Grandparents to
Serve as Important Resources for Their Grandchildren
Grandparental relationships may greatly benefit children.
The
"grandparent-grandchild bond is unique and precious, and stronger than any
other except that between parent and child. Grandparents are said to
provide stability and support in a child's life, especially when parents are
divorced or separated, or a parent has died. ' 214 In such circumstances,
grandparents can help "neutraliz[e] the damaging effects of divorce, death,
or drug [addiction]. '"215
Grandparental relationships may even give
something to a child that, arguably, a parent cannot. Grandparents may
provide information about the history and traditions of
a family. They can
216
offer "roots and a sense of identity" to grandchildren.
The "best interests plus" standard recognizes the value of these benefits.
The standard allows children to maintain a meaningful relationship with
grandparents if the grandparents show that it is in the best interests of the
children (and any other state-specific requirements). It can be argued that
the harm standard, by requiring a showing of harm, denies the value of the
benefits derived from the grandparental relationship. The harm standard
assumes that no benefit from the grandparental relationship would justify
intrusion into family life; rather, only harm to the child absent visitation
would support such an intrusion. The "best interests plus" standard
properly values grandparental relationship benefits by allowing these
benefits to justify court intervention.
4. Because Grandparental Visitation Is Temporary and Occasional, the
Resulting Intrusion upon Parental Authority Is Minimal
Proponents of the "best interests plus" standard argue that it does not
significantly divest parental authority.2 17 While they acknowledge some
level of intrusion into parental authority, they argue that the intrusion is
212. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
213. For a discussion of state recognition of extended families and the need for protection
of the grandparental relationship, see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63-64.
214. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 895 (Pa. 2006).
216. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 7 ("[G]randparents are believed to be
uniquely qualified to provide roots and a sense of identity to their grandchildren.").
217. See Hiller, 904 A.2d at 903; Brief for States of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 18, Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (No. 99-138) [hereinafter Brief for the
States of Washington et al.].
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simply not that great, 2 18 because visitation is not the equivalent of custody.
Visitation is merely a "temporary and occasional" intrusion into parental
authority. 2 19 Visitation arrangements with grandparents can be as little as
one weekend per year or as frequent as two full weekends per month. 220
Even under a system of generous visitation rights, 22 1 a child still spends
twenty-six out of thirty days per month with her parents. "Best interests
plus" proponents defend the standard on the grounds that such transient and
limited exposure to grandparents cannot be deemed a serious intrusion into
22 2
parental authority.
5. Supreme Court Adoption of the "Best Interests Plus" Standard Allows
States to Decide Which Standard Meets Their Needs
Thus far, this Note has discussed which standard state legislatures and
courts should adopt in the context of grandparent visitation disputes. This
section focuses instead on which standard the Supreme Court should adopt.
Family law is an area traditionally left to the states. 223 The reason for
this delegation is that the federal government possesses no general police
power to interfere in purely social issues, and the power to regulate

interstate commerce does not extend to the family. 224 Further, a state is in a

better position than the federal government to weigh which interests are
important to its people. An interest that is important to one state might be
less important to another. For example, one state might view children's
welfare as a paramount interest of the state, and believe that the state should
interfere for lesser reasons than harm in order to secure child welfare. This
state would likely adopt the "best interests plus" standard. Another state,
however, might view the protection of its citizens' liberties (including the
fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children) as
among the most important interests of the state. The legislature of this state
might adopt the harm standard. These standards then reflect the state
legislature's determination of which interests are most important to the
5
state.22
218. See Hiller, 904 A.2d at 903.
219. Id.
220. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61 (dealing with grandparents who petitioned for two full
weekends per month and two-week-long visits per summer with the grandchildren); see also
Laurence C. Nolan, Beyond Troxel: The Pragmatic Challenges of Grandparent Visitation
Continue, 50 Drake L. Rev. 267, 281 (2002) (explaining outside bounds of typical visitation
orders).

221. An example of such a generous visitation right would be a grant of two weekends
per month with the grandchildren.
222. See supra note 217.
223. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 850 (1997) ("[D]omestic relations law is
primarily an area of state concern .. ");Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 791 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

224. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
225. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788 n.13, 789 n.15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining
how New York's grandparent visitation statute reflects the New York legislature's
conception of its important interests).
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If the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the harm standard (rather than
the "best interests plus" standard) is necessary to protect the parent's
fundamental right, then no individual state could employ the "best interests
plus" standard. The Court's determination that the "best interests plus"
standard insufficiently protects parental rights would govern. This would
result in the federal judiciary determining for the states what their interests
are in the area of family law. 226 . It would constitute a federal, judicial
intrusion into an area traditionally left to states. If instead the Supreme
Court upheld the "best interests plus" standard, it would allow the states to
choose either the "best interests plus" standard or the harm standard (since
the harm standard gives greater protection to parental rights). Because
states should determine their own interests, and the decision to adopt either
standard should ultimately reside with the states, proponents argue that the
227
Supreme Court should adopt the "best interests plus" standard.
228
Further, states are good testing grounds for new family law ideas.
Requiring the harm standard would quell social experimentation of family
law on a state-by-state basis. As then-Justice William Rehnquist explained
in Santosky v. Kramer,
[T]he majority's approach will inevitably lead to the federalization of
family law. Such a trend will only thwart state searches for better
solutions in an area where this Court should encourage state
experimentation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to
2 29
the rest of the country.
To declare that all states must use a harm standard would deprive the states
of the benefits of testing new standards in family law. Thus, supporters of
the "best interests plus" standard argue that it should remain available to
states.230

226. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that it should be up to the states to "assess in the first instance the relative importance of the
conflicting interests that give rise to [visitation] disputes").
227. See Brief for the Petitioners at 27-28, Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (No. 99-138) [hereinafter
Brief for the Petitioners]; see also Brief for the AARP and Generations United, supra note
205, at 17-24.
228. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(explaining the role of states as laboratories to test out new ideas); Santosky, 455 U.S at 773
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining the role of states as laboratories to test out new ideas
specifically within the area of family law).
229. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 773 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
230. See supra note 227.
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6. Requiring the Harm Standard Would Invalidate Most State Grandparent
Visitation Statutes
Only five states, Georgia, Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas,
facially require harm. 23 1 The rest either require harm in application or do
not require harm at all.2 32 If the Court were to determine that "best interests
states would
plus" gives insufficient protection to parental rights, forty-five
2 33
probably have to amend their grandparent visitation statutes.
7. A View of the Family as a Collection of Individuals and a Circumspect
View of the Family Would Support the "Best Interests Plus" Standard
Certain conceptions of the family may shape whether one supports the
"best interests plus" or harm standard. This section discusses hypothetical
conceptions of the family that this Note poses to demonstrate the types of
conceptions that would support one standard or the other.
There are two particular views of the family that might support the "best
interests plus" standard. The first view conceptualizes the family as a
collection of individuals. One definition of this view of the family is as
follows: "A family is a living system, an entity, whose members are its
interacting parts ....A family ...includes individuals who share or seek
to share intimate relationships with each other."2 34 Each individual has his
or her own interests, and the family should support the maximization of
those interests. If a family is a collection of individual self seekers, then
each member's personal interest is important, not just the interest of the
family as a whole. This recognizes a father's interests, a mother's interests,
and also the child's interests. The emphasis placed on the child's interests
means that the best interests of the child are an important concern, on par
with the parental right to the care, custody, and control of the child. Such a
view of children's rights would weaken the justification for deference to
parental decision making absent harm. The role of the state is no longer
merely to protect the parent's right, but also to protect the child's right.
Protection of the child's right may require the state to intervene at an earlier
point. Proponents of this view of the family would support the "best
interests plus" standard because it gives greater weight to the child's
interests vis-A-vis the parent's fundamental right.
The second view of the family that might support the "best interests plus"
standard is wary of family autonomy, and questions whether state deference
231. See supra note 162.
232. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
233. See Brief for the AARP and Generations United, supra note 205, at 19. This source
asserts that forty-nine states would have to amend their statutes. The law has since changed,
and five state statutes now explicitly adopt the harm standard. See supra note 162.
234. John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal
Strangers, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 351, 372 (1998) (quoting Susan L. Brooks, A Family
Systems Paradigmfor Legal Decision Making Affecting Child Custody, 6 Cornell J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 1, 4 (1996)).
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to parents is always positive for the child. 235 Like the previous view, this
view of family recognizes children's interests. Yet, this view claims that it
is the responsibility of the state to protect children from their parents. This
view recognizes that "the idyllic picture of American family life portrayed
'2 36
by the Supreme Court clearly does not match the contemporary reality.
Some families are afflicted with domestic violence, child abuse, or
emotional neglect. Some parents instill views in their children that may
stunt children's growth. For example, suppose a parent believes that all
women are inferior to men and should be subordinate to them. The
"circumspect" view of the family would posit that the state is justified in
intervening to protect the child from the "ignorant" view of his parents.
The state could intervene by ordering visitation with a grandparent who
believes that men and women are equals because exposure to such a
viewpoint would be in the best interests of the child. Under this
hypothetical view of the family, near-absolute deference to parental
autonomy is no longer justified. Rather, the state may intervene earlier,
upon a showing that it would be in the best interests of the child, to ensure
that the child's individual interest is maximized.
B. The Harm Standard
Part II.A explained the arguments that support and undermine the "best
interests plus" standard. This section explores the alternative standard postTroxel, the harm standard, by examining arguments typically made for and
against its use. Recall that the harm standard requires grandparents to
demonstrate that the denial of visitation would cause harm to the child.
1. The Harm Standard Is Firmly Rooted in Constitutional Law Principles
The Supreme Court has established parental autonomy concerning child
rearing as an essential component of liberty under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause guarantees that
"[n]o state shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."' 237 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held that a
Nebraska statute forbidding the teaching of foreign languages to a child
before reaching the eighth grade violated the Due Process Clause. 238 The
Court reasoned that "liberty" in the Due Process Clause was not limited to
bodily restraint, but rather includes the right to "marry, establish a home

235. This view of the family has not been formally presented in any work. It is merely a
hypothetical conception of the family that this Note poses in order to gain a sense of what
types of conceptions would support bne standard or the other.
236. See Howard Ball, The Supreme Court in the Intimate Lives of Americans 122 (2002)
(citing Am. Psychological Ass'n, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological and Legal Issues 21

(Gary B. Melton ed., 1986)).
237. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
238. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also supra notes 94-96 and

accompanying text.
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and bring up children." 239 Parents have a fundamental right to control the
education of their children under the Due Process Clause, and the Nebraska
statute unconstitutionally infringed on that right. 240 Further, in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, the Court struck down a law that required children to
attend public rather than private schools. 24 1 The Court held that parents
have the "liberty . . . to direct the upbringing and education of [their]
children," and the statute at issue violated that fundamental right in an
attempt to "standardize its children." 242 Both Meyer and Pierce recognize
that parents have a fundamental right to control the way in which their
will protect decisions that fall within the
children are raised, and that courts
"private realm of family life."' 243
The Supreme Court has continually upheld parents' substantive due
process right to the care, custody, and control of their children. In Santosky
v. Kramer, the Court reaffirmed the "fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child."' 244 It noted
that this interest 245cannot be overridden merely because parents are not
"model parents."
In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court reiterated that "[t]he
rights to conceive.and to raise one's children have been deemed essential,
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
basic civil rights of man ....
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents." 246 The Court made clear
that this interest "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection." 247 However, this interest is not
absolute. 24 8 The question is, at what point and on what grounds may the
State protect children notwithstanding this liberty interest of parents?
Traditionally, state intrusion into the private realm is permissible in order
to protect the state's citizens from harm. In Prince v. Massachusetts, a
child's custodial parent (the child's aunt) challenged the constitutionality of
her conviction under a child labor statute. 249 The defendant had allowed
children in her custody to preach for the Jehovah's Witness religion on
public highways. 250 The Court found that there were dangers in preaching
on public highways and selling religious materials. 25 1 The state's interest in
protecting children from this potential danger justified its intrusion into

239. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
240. See id.

241. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also supra notes 97-99 and
accompanying text.
242. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
243. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
244. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
245. Id.
246. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. Id.
248. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) ("[T]he family is not
beyond regulation."); Prince,321 U.S. at 166.
249. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 159.
250. Id. at 162-63.
251. Id. at 168-69.
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private family affairs, and the Court upheld her conviction.2 52 Similarly, in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, compulsory small pox vaccinations ordered
over a parent's objection were justified as an exercise of the state's police
253
power to regulate the public health and prevent harm to its citizens.
Finally, in Parham v. JR., the Court overrode the parents' decision to
institutionalize their child in a mental health facility. 254 The state argued

that its trained professionals found institutionalization unnecessary, 255 that
limited state resources should be saved for those truly in need, 25 6 and that
unnecessary institutionalization stigmatizes children. 2 57 The Court upheld
the state's determination, explaining that "a state is not without
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when
2 58
their physical or mental health is jeopardized.
Certain Supreme Court cases indicate that, absent such harm, state
intrusion may not be justified. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, two Amish parents
challenged the constitutionality of a state statute that required children to
attend public schools until the age of sixteen. 2 59 The Amish parents
allowed their children to attend public school until they reached fourteen,
but challenged the last two years of compulsory public school education. 2 60
The Supreme Court exempted plaintiffs from enforcement of the statute
because the state's interest was not great enough to override their parental
or religious rights. 26 1 While recognizing the state's interest in education
and children's welfare, the Court made clear that the state may act to further
that interest only "if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social
burdens." 262 In other words, the state could not compel public school
attendance and interfere in parental decision making unless the failure to do
so would cause emotional or physical harm to the child. The parents
demonstrated that the lack of two more years of state education would not
cause any harm to the long-term welfare of the child. 26 3 Accordingly, the

state had no basis to intervene in this private, parental decision, and the
252. See id. at 169-70.
253. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
254. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
255. See id. at 589-90.
256. See id. at 604-05.
257. See id. at 600 (noting that societal awareness that the child has received psychiatric
help can itself be damaging).
258. Id. at 603.
259. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
260. See id. at 207.
261. See id. at 234-35.
262. Id. at 234. One could argue that Yoder is case specific and that the Court held for the
parents because of their free exercise interests as Amish parents, or because of social
burdens on the welfare system that Amish children could pose when they reached adulthood.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, when it explained that it would not have ruled as it
did were it not for the parent's Due Process Clause right to control child rearing. 494 U.S.
872, 881 (1990).
263. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222.
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parents were granted an exemption
from compulsory public education until
264
their children reached sixteen.
These cases highlight the constitutional law principle that a state may not
interfere with private child-rearing decisions of parents unless such
intervention prevents harm to their children. As Howard Ball explains,
"Parental conduct, whether in disciplining the child or in general decision
making on behalf of the child, is generally protected unless it constitutes
abuse or neglect of the child. ' 265 The "harm standard" recognizes those
boundaries set between the state and the individual, and by deferring to
parental decisions absent harm, it fully effectuates the parental right to the
care, custody, and control of one's child.
Critics of the harm standard argue that there is no fundamental,
constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of one's child. 266 They
267
claim that Meyer and Pierce do not stand for such a broad proposition.
Rather, Meyer and Pierceshould be construed narrowly to hold that there is
a fundamental right to learn the German language and to attend private
school, or, at the most, that Meyer and Pierce stand for the right of parents
to direct their children's education, not to control all aspects of their
upbringing. Beyond this narrow construction, a parent does not have a
general, abstract right to the care and control of a child. It follows that state
intervention in parental decisions regarding visitation does not infringe on
any fundamental right, since a parent does not possess such a fundamental
right. The state would not have to defer to parental decision making absent
a showing of harm; the basis for drawing the line at harm would erode.
Rather than heightened scrutiny, courts would apply mere rational basis
scrutiny. The state would claim that serving the best interests of the child is
a legitimate state interest. Further, in any particular case, the state would
claim that the court's application of a visitation statute to require
grandparent visitation is rationally related to the child's best interests.
Thus, reading Meyer and Pierce narrowly would undercut-if not
destroy-the basis for the harm standard.
However, the broad language of Pierce may counsel against such a
narrow construction. The Court in Pierce established as fundamental the
right of parents "to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control. '268 Upbringing is not limited to the learning of foreign
languages or the choice over a child's school. Upbringing typically means
264. See id. at 234.
265. See Ball, supra note 236, at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia acknowledges that such a right may exist in the Declaration of Independence, but
denies that it is a constitutional right. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text; see
also Brief for the States of Washington et al., supra note 217, at 12-14.
267. See Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 7-12, Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (No. 99-138); see also Brief for the
Petitioners, supra note 227, at 25-26 (arguing that these cases should be construed as First
Amendment cases only).
268. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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the "rearing and training received during childhood. '269 In fact, the Court
itself acknowledges that a parent's role is to "nurture him and direct his
destiny" and "prepare him for additional obligations." 2 70 This definition
would seem to include the right to determine a child's associations and
relationships. Further, even if the Supreme Court had intended such a
narrow meaning at the time, the line of cases since Pierce assumes a
broader, fundamental right of parents to control childrearing. 2 71 The harm
standard respects this parental right as fundamental by deferring to a
visitation absent a compelling interest-to
parent's decisions regarding
272
prevent harm to children.
Another problem that proponents of the harm standard may face is that
27 3
posed by DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.
DeShaney's holding raises questions about the validity of the harm
standard. The issue in DeShaney was whether the state Department of
Social Services was obligated to protect a boy, Joshua, from his abusive
father, who killed him after the state became aware of such abuse. 2 74 The
Court held that the state did not have to protect Joshua because the state has
27 5
no obligation to protect its citizens from harm caused by third parties.
Under DeShaney, then, the state does not have to intervene in visitation
disputes even if there is a showing of harm caused by the denial of
visitation. However, this in no way invalidates the basis for the harm
standard. The harm standard merely holds that the state may intervene at
the point of harm, not that it must do so.
2. The Prevention of Harm Survives Strict Scrutiny, While Best Interests
Does Not
Conventional constitutional analysis supports states' adoption of the
harm standard. Traditionally, laws that infringe on fundamental rights are
subjected to strict scrutiny. 276 Strict scrutiny requires that the government
assert a compelling state interest and that the law be narrowly tailored to
further that state interest. 277 Here, the fundamental right at stake is the right
of a parent to the care, custody, and control of one's child. 2 78 The Supreme

269.
270.
271.
272.

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1889 (4th ed. 2000).
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
See supra notes 238-47, 259-64 and accompanying text.
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Washington as Amici

Curiae Supporting Respondent at 22-24, Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (No. 99-138) [hereinafter Brief
for the American Civil Liberties Union]; Scott C. Boen, Grandparent Visitation Statutes:
The Constitutionalityof Court Ordered Grandparent Visitation Absent a Showing of Harm
to the Child, 20 J. Juv. L. 23, 26-28 (1999).
273. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
274. See id. at 191-94.

275. Id. at 195-96.
276. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155-56 (1973).
277. See Washington, 521 U.S. at 720-21; Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
278. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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Court has not explicitly stated that strict scrutiny analysis applies to
fundamental rights regarding family autonomy. 279 However, most state
courts have held that strict scrutiny applies when a state law infringes on the
280
fundamental right of parents to control the upbringing of their children.

Under state law interpretation, grandparent visitation statutes must allege a
compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored towards that interest. 2 81

First, the state's interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision is not
compelling.

Justice Thomas asserted that this was Washington state's

interest in Troxel,282 though no state has officially framed its interest as
such. Thomas's conception of the state interest in Troxel likely reflects an
anti-paternalistic belief that the state should not interfere in such private
decisions. 2 83 Regardless of the state's true interest, it is likely that the
interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decisions would not be deemed
compelling.

2 84

Second, the state's interest in promoting children's welfare or best
interests is not sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion into a parent's
fundamental right. The state argues that its interest in children's welfare is
so important that it trumps the right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their own children. Thus, if the state considers the parent's objection to
visitation but determines that visitation with grandparents is good for the
child, the state may grant visitation.
The problem with universally

accepting best interests as a compelling interest is that the state may abuse

279. See id. at 65-74 (noting that the parental right at issue is fundamental, and deserves
heightened protection, but failing to announce a standard of review); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that the right of a parent is fundamental, "undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection").
280. See Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 441-42 (Conn. 2002) (stating that strict scrutiny
is required where the fundamental right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their
children is implicated, and the statute infringing on that right must be narrowly tailored "so
that a person's personal affairs are not needlessly intruded upon and interrupted by the
trauma of litigation"); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1995) ("The right to
the custody and control of one's child is a fiercely guarded right in our society and in our
law. It is a right that should be infringed upon only under the most compelling
circumstances." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 532
(I11.2000) (concluding that the state must prove that the Illinois visitation statute serves a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest); Moriarty v. Bradt,
827 A.2d 203, 214-15 (N.J. 2003) (noting that when the state interferes with fundamental
parental rights, the statute must be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest).
281. See supra note 280. But see Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (applying only rational basis scrutiny to the parent's right to care and control of a
child).
282. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
283. See generally Scott Douglas Gerber, First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence
Thomas (1999).
284. The interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decisions has not yet been asserted by a
state in a grandparent visitation dispute. Thus, there is no case law to support the statement
that such an interest would not be deemed compelling. However, since it is debatable
whether the interest in promoting the best interests of children is compelling, and the interest
in second-guessing a fit parent's decisions seems weaker than that, common sense tells us
that the latter interest would not be deemed compelling.
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this power. 285 If it is good for a child to go to church, the state can require
the parent to bring the child to church. If it is good for a child to play
organized sports, the state can require the parent to take the child to soccer
practice. 286 The result may be that whenever the state thinks that an activity
is in the best interests of the child, it can interfere with the parent's
fundamental right. Accordingly, best interests cannot be sufficient to
override parental rights or else the child may truly become the "creature of
the State." 2 87 The state's interest in furthering children's welfare per se
may be compelling; however, it is not sufficiently compelling to trump the
parental right to direct the upbringing of children.
To further illustrate this point, one need look no further than to Troxel.
The state interest asserted in Troxel was promoting the best interests of the
child. 288 One lower court noted that the Troxels (grandparents) could
"provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and
music." 289 Further, this court stated that these things were in the best
interest of the children. 290 While spending time with cousins and cultural
enrichment may be beneficial, one would be hard pressed to argue that they
are sufficiently compelling to justify intruding on a parent's fundamental
right.
Finally, grandparent visitation statutes using the "best interests plus"
standard are not narrowly tailored to promote a child's best interests. In
fact, such statutes may hinder a child's best interests. Generally, spending
time with grandparents is a positive activity, and children can benefit
greatly from such exposure. 2 9 1 All things considered though, it is not
beneficial when it is ordered over a parent's objection. 292 Visitation over a
parent's objection leads to damaging consequences. 293 Children witness
their parent's authority being questioned and may lose faith in the ability of
their parents to parent properly. 294 Further, children may be subjected to
hearing their grandparents disparage their parents. 295 Whatever a child
gains from the grandchild-grandparent relationship, the child may be losing
in the child-parent relationship. The child-parent relationship is the primary
relationship of concern, and damage to that relationship does not serve a
child's best interests. 296 Thus, grandparent visitation statutes using the
285. See Bartlett, supra note 24, at 725.
286. See id.

287. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
288. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 29 (Wash. 1998).
289. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 62 (2000).
290. See id.

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
See Bartlett, supra note 24, at 724.
See infra Part II.B.9.
See infra note 356 and accompanying text.
See Stephen A. Newman, Grandparent Visitation Claims: Assessing the Multiple

Harms of Litigation to Families and Children, 13 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 21, 28 (2003).

296. See Bohl, supra note 60, at 326-28. Bohl argues that the deleterious effects of courtordered grandparent visitation cancel out the benefits. Thus, grandparent visitation statutes
cannot "be justified as an exercise of state power designed to promote children's health and
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"best interests plus" standard are not narrowly tailored to promote a child's
best interests.
Thus far, this section has explained the constitutional analysis that a
proponent of the harm standard would use to show that the "best interests
plus" standard fails strict scrutiny. The state's interest in second-guessing a
fit parent's decisions is not compelling, and the state's interest in promoting
the best interests of the child is not sufficiently compelling to override
fundamental parental rights. Even assuming that promoting the best
interests of the child were sufficiently compelling, the "best interests plus"
standard is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The question
remains if there is any interest sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion
into a parent's fundamental right.
The state's interest in the prevention of harm is compelling. Only at this
point, when there is harm to the child, may the state intervene in family
affairs. Many state courts have held that the prevention of harm is a
297
compelling interest specifically within the grandparent visitation context.
As a Pennsylvania superior court explained in Hiller v. Fausey, "hardly a
more compelling State interest exists than to keep children safe from the
kind of physical or emotional trauma that may scar a child's health and
'298
physical, mental, spiritual, and moral development well into adulthood.
The New Jersey Supreme Court went even further in Moriarty v. Bradt
when it stated that
the only state interest warranting the invocation of the State's parens
patriae jurisdiction to overcome the presumption in favor of a parent's
decision and to force grandparent visitation over the wishes of a fit parent
is the avoidance of harm to the child. When no harm threatens a child's
welfare, the State lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the
infringement299on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children as
they see fit.
The harm standard recognizes that the prevention of harm is the only state
interest sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion into the parent's
fundamental right.
3. The Harm Standard Is Appropriate Because Parents and Grandparents
Are Not Equals
The harm standard is appropriate because it gives the proper weight to
parents' rights vis-A-vis the statutory rights of grandparents. Parents and
welfare." Id. at 327. Rather, "court-ordered grandparent visitation must be considered
contrary to the best interests of the child, at least to some extent." Id.
297. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995); Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d
203, 222-23 (N.J. 2003).
298. Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 895 (Pa. 2006).
299. Moriarty, 827 A.2d at 222. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that while its
decision was interpreting the New Jersey statute at issue, it was confident that U.S. Supreme
Court precedent would support its conclusion.
Princeas support. See id. at 213-14.

It cited Yoder, Stanley, Pierce,Meyer, and
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grandparents do not stand as equals in relation to children in the same way
that two parents do. Where two parents are vying for custody or visitation,
Both parents enjoy the
a best interests standard is appropriate. 30 0
presumption that they will act in the best interests of their child. Both
parents share a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of the
child. The court's only determination, when looking at two equals, is what
is in the best interests of the child.
A grandparent does not stand as an equal to a parent. 30 1 Grandparents
neither share the same presumption that they act in the best interest of the
child nor have the same fundamental right that parents have in the care,
custody, and control of the child. They are relatives petitioning to secure
their relationship with their grandchild. As such, the petition for visitation
requires the judge to perform a different analysis: Rather than seeing two
equals, the judge sees greater parental interests than grandparental interests.
The standard that a judge applies to a visitation dispute should reflect the
relative importance of the parties' interests. The harm standard recognizes
that parents and grandparents do not stand as equals, and gives parental
a showing of harm before
interests greater deference by requiring
30 2
visitation.
secure
may
grandparents
4. The Harm Standard Recognizes that Parental Rights Must Be
Commensurate with Their Responsibilities
The state cannot impose on parents grave responsibilities and then deny
them the rights to carry out these responsibilities. In the United States,
parents have the responsibility of raising their children. 30 3 Parents, not the
30 4
state, have the primary obligation to prepare children for citizenship.
They are to exercise the maturity and the judgment that children lack, and
prepare them for all future obligations. 30 5 However, under the "best
interests plus" standard, parents do not have the rights necessary to fulfill
these obligations. Instead, the state retains rights, through the use of the

300. Brief for The Domestic Violence Project Inc./Safe House (Michigan) et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11-12, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99138) [hereinafter Brief for Domestic Violence Project].
301. See Gregory, supra note 234, at 385 (explaining that a different standard should
apply where the parties are not two natural, fit parents).
302. See generally Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 272, at 5.
303. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
161 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
304. See Parham,442 U.S. at 602; Prince,321 U.S. at 161; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
305. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. Parents' rights have long been recognized as part of an
exchange. Parents receive rights with respect to their children in exchange for agreeing to
carry out certain responsibilities. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98
Yale L.J. 293, 297-98 (1988). John Locke explained this best: "The Power... that Parents
have over their Children, arises from that Duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of
their Off-spring, during the imperfect state of Childhood." Id. at 297 (citing John Locke,
Two Treatises of Government 306 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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"best interests plus" standard, which hinders parents' ability to carry out
their responsibilities.
Wherever authority and responsibility are separate, the authority figure is
less likely to internalize the consequences of its own decisions. 30 6 In the
context of grandparent visitation, the state asserts the right to make
decisions regarding children (by ordering visitation), but does not have
responsibility over them. Instead, parents have the primary obligation to
raise children. 30 7 The result is that the state does not bear the costs of
deciding to order grandparent visitation. If the state orders visitation, it is
the parent that has to drive the child to the grandparent's house and the
parent's relationship with the child that may suffer as a result. Because the
state does not bear those costs, it may order grandparent visitation without
regard to them.
If parents have responsibility for child rearing, they should have
commensurate authority. 30 8 This results in decision making that benefits
children's welfare. Parents would retain requisite authority if states
employed the harm standard. Use of the harm standard makes it less likely
that the state (through the courts) will exercise authority over children
because it requires a more difficult showing before the state may intervene.
Thus, the harm standard more likely retains authority where it places
responsibility-with the parent. The harm standard, by deferring to
parental decision making absent harm, gives parents the authority to carry
out their obligations of child rearing.
Professor Shelley Burtt's theory on parental rights supports the
proposition that parents need authority to carry out their child-rearing
duties. 30 9 In her article, Burtt critiques the position that parents should

306. In an efficient system, rights are allocated to the same entity that has responsibility.
In Towards a Theory of Property Rights, Harold Demsetz explains that rights and
responsibilities should reside in the same entity because it forces the decision maker to
internalize the consequences of his or her decisions. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 347-59 (1967).
By internalizing the
consequences of his or her decisions (externalities), the decision maker is more likely to
make efficient decisions. Demsetz uses the example of a forest with a limited number of
trees. When presented with a finite forest, an individual will chop down all of the trees
immediately and convert them to his or her own use, rather than conserve trees for the
community as a whole to use in the future. This is because future generations will bear the
costs of the decision (the lack of trees), not the individual (who has enough trees today).
Since the individual does not bear the cost of the decision, he or she makes an inefficient
one. Instead, if the individual bore responsibility and rights, he or she would decide to
conserve the trees because he or she would shoulder the consequences of the decision.
307. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
308. See B.B.D. v. D.D. and M.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999) (recognizing that the rights
of parents are commensurate with the responsibilities that they have assumed, and
consequently, that a biological father who has assumed no responsibilities with respect to a
child does not deserve constitutionally protected parental rights).
309. Shelley Burtt, The Proper Scope of Parental Authority: Why We Don't Owe
Children an "Open Future," in Child, Family, and State 243, 243 (Stephen Macedo & Iris
Marion Young eds., 2003).
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provide children with an "open future. ' 310 An open future means that
children should be exposed to "diverse points of view regarding
understandings of ... life," leaving them open to choose what they want
upon reaching adulthood. 3 1 1 Those supporting the "open future" role of a
parent ground parental authority on the child's deficit of rationality. 3 12 In
other words, they believe that parents control children because children lack
rational thought. They analogize children's rational deficit to that of
incompetents, and accordingly, treat children like incompetents. 3 13 Until
the age of majority, we allow parents to substitute their judgment for their
children's much as we allow guardians to substitute their judgment for
incompetents'.
Burtt argues that this analogy between children and incompetents is
misguided. 3 14 Although children lack rational judgment until the age of
majority, they will eventually be capable of making informed, rational
decisions. 3 15 Incompetents, however, will never be able to make such
decisions. Thus, the role of a guardian over an incompetent and a parent
over a child is markedly different. The parent, rather than making the child
a blank slate with an open future, must prepare the child to make important
decisions and to fulfill other obligations of adulthood. 3 16 If adult rule over
children's lives is not merely to guide them through life, as with an
incompetent, but rather is to prepare and equip them for future obligations,
then the parent must have greater authority to fulfill those duties than the
"best interests plus" standard provides. "Any fully adequate account of the
distribution of authority over children must incorporate this fact,
acknowledging that adult rule over children exists not simply to supply a
deficit until such time as the child matures but rather actively to shape the
'3 17
child's morals, goals, dispositions, habits, and virtues.
Ultimately, "[a] different picture of children's needs will produce a
different picture of what adult authority over them exists to supply-with a
corresponding change in how we judge the scope and limits of that
authority. '3 18 If we view the parent's responsibility not just as filling the
gaps of rational deficit but also preparing children for the future, the parent
must have greater authority to carry this out. The question becomes exactly
how much authority is necessary. Burtt argues that parents can exercise
"decisive influence over their children's worldviews and values" and that
"the state properly intervenes in family decision making only when [a
child's] developmental needs are demonstrably in jeopardy." 3 19 However,
310. See id. at 246.
311. Id. at 245.
312. Seeid. at251.
313. See id. at 255.
314. Id.
315. Id.

316. Id.
317. Id. at 253.
318. Id.

319. Id. at 248.
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if there were no basis for the belief that parents are to prepare children for
the future, the entire exercise would be purely academic. The Supreme
Court provides this authority. In Parham and its progeny, the Court
explicitly stated that it is the role of parents to prepare children for the
future, and that the state cannot fulfill that role. 320 The Supreme Court's
view of parental responsibilities requires that parents have requisite
authority to fulfill them.
5. The Harm Standard Actually Effectuates the Best Interests of the Child
The harm standard furthers children's best interests in two distinct ways:
by reaffirming children's faith in their parents and by providing continuity
in children's lives. First, children's interests are best served by giving their
fit parents complete authority. 32 1 Children learn to rely on parents as
trustees of their well-being. When the state questions a parent's ability to
parent, the child is left confused and unsure of his or her own welfare.
"When family integrity is broken or weakened by State intrusion... (the
younger child's) needs are thwarted and his belief that his parents are
omniscient and all powerful is shaken prematurely. The effect on the
child's developmental progress is invariably detrimental. '322 It is important
for children to have faith in a parent's authority and consequent ability to
parent, and it is important that children not second-guess their parents'
decisions because they have watched others do so. These benefits are best
obtained through strong parental authority, 323 protected by the harm
standard.
Moreover, courts have no reason to believe that strong parental authority
does not effectuate a child's best interests. It is presumed that "fit parents
act in the best interests of their children. '324 Fit parents will presumably
make decisions in their children's best interests about whether to allow
visitation time with grandparents. Unless there is a showing of unfitness, it
is legally presumed that parental control will effectuate the child's best
interests. Chief Justice Ralph Cappy, dissenting in the Pennsylvania
superior court case Hiller v. Fausey, summed up this argument:
I find it important to note that, in my view, this construct [the harm
standard, including a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests
of their child] promotes the best interest of the child. On the one hand, if
a grandparent is unable to demonstrate harm in cases such as this, the
court may not interfere with the parent's decisions. What is left is a fit
parent who is presumed to act in the child's best interests. On the other
320. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
321. See generally Bartlett, supra note 24.
322. See William Duncan, The Constitutional Protection of Parental Rights:

A

Discussion of the Advantages and Disadvantages of According Fundamental Status to

ParentalRights and Duties, in Parenthood in Modem Society: Legal and Social Issues for
the Twenty-First Century 431, 435 (John Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic eds., 1993).
323. See infra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
324. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
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hand, if a grandparent adequately demonstrates harm, then the court is left
with the task of drafting an order which is narrowly tailored to protect the
welfare of the child.325Such an order, by its very nature, promotes the best
interest of the child.
Second, the harm standard furthers children's best interests by ensuring
continuity in their lives. Continuity is extremely important for children of
all ages. 326 For toddlers, continuity in the caretaker role establishes trust in
the caretaker. 32 7 When there is a disruption in caretaker responsibilities, the
child suffers "separation distress and anxiety," and may find it difficult to
trust others in the future. 32 8 Further, lack of continuity in the lives of older
children may affect their ability to subscribe to any one set of social
principles, often manifesting itself in unruly school behavior. 329 The harm
standard more likely secures continuity of the caretaker role by making it
more difficult for grandparents to gain visitation rights.
As Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit write, "To safeguard the right
of parents to raise their children as they see fit, free of government
intrusion, except in cases of neglect and abandonment, is to safeguard each
330
child's need for continuity."
6. The Harm Standard Awards Visitation Only Where It Is Appropriate
Since both the "best interests plus" and harm standards will sometimes
allow for visitation, the question is which standard grants visitation where
appropriate. It can be argued that the harm standard would result in the
denial of visitation where it is necessary and beneficial for the child. 33 1 For
example, suppose that a mother recently passed away and the father denies
visitation rights to the maternal grandparents. 3 32 Throughout the child's
life, the grandparents saw the child daily by serving as the primary
caretakers while the parents were at work. After the mother's death, the
grandparents were a source of stability in the child's life and helped the
child cope with the mother's death in ways that the father admittedly could
not. Cases with such facts might be cited to denounce the harm standard as
overly rigid, suggesting that visitation should be awarded in such a case.
However, in such a case, the court would most likely grant visitation rights
to the grandparents under the harm standard. Where the grandparents were
325. Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 905 n.3 (Pa. 2006) (Cappy, C.J., dissenting).
326. Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J.Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child 32 (1973).
327. See id. at 32-33.
328. Id. at 33.
329. See id. at 33-34.
330. Id. at 7.
331. See Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 890 (Pa. 2006) (noting that the harm standard
"would set the bar too high, vitiating the purpose of the statute").
332. These are the facts of Hiller, a Pennsylvania superior court case wherein the court
applied the "best interests plus" standard. Id. The court awarded visitation rights to the
grandparents in this case. This Note argues that, even under the harm standard, the court
would in all likelihood have granted visitation time with the grandparents.
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close to the child and could help the child cope with a parent's death in a
way that the surviving parent could not, a court would likely find harm in
the denial of grandparent visitation. Without such visitation, the child may
suffer emotionally since the surviving parent is struggling to serve as a
support system for the child. 333 In the end, the "harm" standard would
grant visitation in the cases where such rights are appropriate.
7. The Harm Standard Should Be Applied Because Application of the
"Best Interests Plus" Standard Would Lead to Judicial Supervision of
Family Life
Advocates of the harm standard argue that it protects individuals from
judicial supervision of their lives while the "best interests plus" standard
invites it. The "best interests plus" standard requires a judge to make a
determination about what is in the best interests of the child. In order to
make such a decision, the judge will inquire into the child's relationship
with both the parents and the grandparents. The parents will have to
explain the activities that they choose to do with the child, how much time
they spend with the child, etc. In short, parents will be forced to defend life
choices that they have made for their children, not just the decision to deny
visitation time with grandparents.
Judicial supervision may go beyond mere questioning. 334 Judges may
impose their views of child rearing on a parent. If a judge thinks that it is
important for children to spend time with their grandparents, he or she can
order visitation time without fear of public inquiry into such decisions or
public second-guessing. This is because the "best interests plus" standard is
about balancing interests. The balancing approach allows judges to place
great emphasis on certain factors, even the sentimental belief that children
should spend time with grandparents, without having to give specific
reasons. A judge's reasons may hide under the veil of "best interests of the
child. '3 35 The result is judicial steering of child rearing, whereby the court
decides with whom a child should associate. The fear is that judicial
supervision in the visitation context may lead to judicial supervision of

333. See id. at 878-79.
334. See Mack, supra note 78, at 84-85 (explaining the argument that the state has
become a "superparent," using its experts to determine that a parent's techniques are not in
the best interests of the child, and then imposing its own "effective and enlightened" childrearing views on parents).
335. Professor Katharine Bartlett has noted that the best interests analysis does not
"compel[] transparency." See Katharine T. Bartlett, ComparingRace andSex Discrimination
in Custody Cases, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 877, 884 & n.35 (2000). Bartlett gives examples of a
number of cases where courts denied custody to white mothers after they had affairs with
black men. In those cases, courts used other justifications for the denial of custody, such as
"that the mother lied about the affair or that her sexual activity displayed poor moral
judgment." Id. at 884. The "best interest plus" standard allows such pretextual justifications
to hide within the best interests analysis. See id.
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family life in general. 336 As discussed in Part II.B.2 of this Note, the judge
could decide that other activities, such as going to church or to museums,
are also in a child's best interest. 337 The harm standard does not allow such
subjective determinations.
To prevent the "[descent] into judicial
supervision of family life, '3 38 the harm standard should be adopted. Absent
harm, the state should not determine, or even question, a parent's childrearing decisions.
8. The Harm Standard Is Determinate
The harm standard is more determinate and more capable of being
applied even handedly than the "best interests plus" standard. As explained
in Part I, courts have found harm where a child will have only negative
images of a deceased or divorced parent in the absence of grandparent
visitation.339 Courts have also found harm in the denial of visitation where
abruptly ending visitation with the grandparents would cause severe
psychological damage to the child. 340 These applications of the harm
standard show that it has some outer limit. To the contrary, the factors that
may serve a child's best interests seem endless. The few state courts that
endeavor to list best interest factors give vastly different sets of factors to
consider. 34 1 The result is a vague standard that cannot be evenly applied to
34 2
all petitioners.
To be sure, there is some subjectivity even in a harm standard. One
judge's definition of what is harmful to a child may be different from
another's. On the whole, however, the harm standard is more clearly
defined and more grounded in public consensus than the "best interests
plus" standard. "While there is no consensus about what is best for a child,
there is much consensus about what is very bad ....,,343
Not only is the definition of the "best interests plus" standard itself
vague, but so is its application. Applying the "best interests plus" standard
requires that the court give "special weight" to the parent's decision
regarding visitation. 344 But what is special weight? 34 5 Does that mean a
336. See Joan C. Bohl, The "Unprecedented Intrusion": A Survey and Analysis of
Selected GrandparentVisitation Cases, 49 Okla. L. Rev. 29, 80 (1996) ("If we collectively

allow grandparent visitation to be forced upon an unwilling family for no better reason than
that some robed stranger thought it best, we have embarked upon a slow [descent] into
judicial supervision of family life which has neither legal limits nor a logical end.").
337. See Bartlett, supra note 24, at 725.
338. See Bohl, supra note 336, at 80.

339. See supra notes 169-95 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 169-95 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
342. See Gregory, supra note 234, at 386-88.
343. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226, 261 (1975).

344. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000).
345. See Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 904 n.1 (Pa. 2006) (Cappy, C.J., dissenting)

(noting that the majority does not explain what special weight is or how a court is to apply
it).
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little weight or a lot? Does that mean that courts should tip the scales in
favor of parental rights or that courts should give greater consideration to
the rationale behind the parent's decision?
Further, the "best interests plus" standard is more susceptible to being
applied discriminatorily. The "imprecise substantive standard[] ... leave[s]
346
determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge."
Judges are empowered to make decisions that involve moral and personal
beliefs about families. Social bias inevitably pervades these determinations.
The result is that "[p]oorer, less educated [yet fit] parents will always look
worse in relation to older, seemingly more established and settled
grandparents, who often have significantly more resources." 34 7 Fit, single
parents will also experience discrimination at the hands of judges 34 8 who
believe that children's lives are incomplete without both a mother and a
father, and may order grandparent visitation to fill that perceived void. The
real problem with the infiltration of bias is not lack of fairness per se, but
rather that it violates the "fundamental precept that like cases should be
decided alike." 349 Cases with identical facts will be decided differently
because of preconceived judicial notions of the family. The only way to
greater uniformity, is to
minimize the infiltration of bias, and thus ensure
350
choose the more determinate standard of harm.
9. Grandparent Visitation Suits Are Damaging to All Parties Involved, and
the Harm Standard Decreases the Likelihood that Grandparents Will Bring
Visitation Suits
Grandparent visitation suits can be very damaging to children. Children
are subjected to the "ill feelings, bitterness, and animosity" that grow
between parents and grandparents in a visitation dispute. 35 1 Parents
complain about the way their own parents raised them, bringing up
unpleasant memories from childhood. 352 Grandparents launch personal
attacks on the way that their children raise the grandchildren. 353 In the end,
the child is stuck in the middle and feels compelled to choose sides. Or,
even worse, the child blames himself or herself. The following summarizes
some of the damaging effects of visitation disputes on children:
Children in this situation will (1) see that they are at the heart of the
family strife; (2) experience the stress of loyalty conflicts; (3) perceive
that the normal authority of their parent has been undermined by the
power of the grandparent and the judge; (4) have to deal with attempts by
346. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982).
347. Brief for the Domestic Violence Project, supra note 300, at 21.
348. See id.

349. Mnookin, supra note 343, at 263.
350. See Gregory, supra note 234, at 387 (explaining the opinion that "almost any
automatic rule would be an improvement over the present situation").
351. See Strouse v. Olson, 397 N.W.2d 651, 655 (S.D. 1986).
352. See Newman, supra note 295, at 28.
353. See id.
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parents, grandparents, or both to pressure or cajole them into taking sides
in the conflict; (5) be exposed to a grandparent who communicatesexplicitly or implicitly-anger at and criticism of the parent; (6) feel
nervous, anxious, or frightened by the compulsion to do what their mother
or father (or both) strongly opposes; (7) return from visitation to a parent
who feels angered and upset by the grandparent's unwanted imposition
and control; (8) experience the tensions in their 354
own households caused
by the tremendous stress of the litigation process.
Further, these suits are usually initiated at a time when children are already
vulnerable, such as after divorce or the death of one parent. 355 Children are
already struggling to cope with the tearing apart of their family and a
lawsuit threatens to further destroy their family.
Grandparent visitation suits also damage the parent-child relationship.
The once-strong parent-child relationship is put under a microscope by a
judge, and the parent's decisions are called into question. The child
witnesses his or her parent's authority being questioned, and may doubt his
parent's ability to parent. "No matter how hard the system may try to
convey a 'best interest' message, the real message to the child is that there
is no stability and certainty in the child's world and the child cannot look to
3 56
his or her own fit parent for guidance."
The system fails to appreciate the importance of parental autonomy for
the parent-child relationship. Children need to feel that they can turn to
their parents for guidance, and that their parents' guidance will be sound.
Judicial second-guessing of parental decisions strips the parent-child
relationship of this sense of security and confidence. "[M]ore than access
to their grandparents, children need parents who have the kind of autonomy
and responsibility that includes deciding with whom their children are
going to spend time." 35 7 Justice Kennedy's dissent in Troxel summarized
this point nicely:
It must be recognized... that a domestic relations proceeding in and
of itself can constitute state intervention that is so disruptive of the parentchild relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to
make certain basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes
implicated. The best interests of the child standard has at times been
criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpredictable results. If a single
parent who is struggling to raise a child is faced with visitation demands
from a third party, the attorney's fees alone might destroy her hopes and
plans for the child's future. Our system must confront more often the
reality that litigation can itself be so disruptive that constitutional
protection may be required; and I do not discount the possibility that in

354.
355.
356.
357.

Id. at 28-29.
See id. at 27.
Brief for Domestic Violence Project, supra note 300, at 18-19.
Bartlett, supra note 24, at 724.
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may provide
some instances the best interests of the child standard
358
insufficient protection to the parent-child relationship.
Rather than strengthen a familial bond, grandparent visitation suits may
weaken one (the parent-child relationship).
Grandparent visitation may also damage child-rearing efforts. Families
that rely on grandparents to assist in child rearing are often low-income or
single parent households. 359 Sometimes, the relationship between the
parents and grandparents deteriorates. The parents then look elsewhere for
child-rearing help. In response, the grandparents may petition for formal
visitation rights to continue seeing the grandchildren. This may result in
litigation, whereby the parents are forced into court simply because they
sought child-rearing assistance from grandparents and now want to seek
alternative assistance. The parents' reliance on grandparent assistance may
backfire on parents that so desperately need their help. 360 Parents should be
to help raise children without fear that it will
able to rely on grandparents
36 1
subject them to litigation.
The damaging effects of litigation on children, the parent-child
relationship, and child-rearing efforts are more likely to occur under the
"best interests plus" standard. The "best interests plus" standard creates
incentives to litigate. "[T]he use of an indeterminate standard makes the
outcome of litigation difficult to predict. This may encourage more
litigation than would a standard that made the outcome of more cases
predictable." 362 Since every litigant "can make plausible arguments why a
child would be better off with him or her," the "best interests plus" standard
invites such litigation. 363 Supporters of the harm standard argue for its
adoption because its high threshold discourages such lawsuits and protects
all parties from the damaging effects of litigation.
10. A View of the Family as a Buffer from an Overreaching State Supports
the Harm Standard
Former Senator Rick Santorum wrote a book titled It Takes a Family to
counter Senator Hillary Clinton's book It Takes a Village.364 Both books
ask two important questions: whether society should be structured in a topdown or a bottom-up approach, and, in turn, how American children should
be raised. 36 5 A top-down approach relies on large institutions such as
universities and government agencies to make important decisions that will
358. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 101 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,dissenting) (citation
omitted).
359. Brief for Domestic Violence Project, supra note 300, at 23-24.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. Mnookin, supra note 343, at 262.
363. Id.
364. See generally Hillary Rodham Clinton, It Takes a Village (1996); Rick Santorum, It
Takes a Family: Conservatism and the Common Good (2005).
365. See generally Santorum, supra note 364; Clinton, supra note 364.
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trickle down to affect people. 366 A bottom-up approach relies on smaller,
local organizations such as churches and civic groups to lead society, with
the help of mothers and fathers. 367 Santorum argues that the family is the
most important structure in American society, and that a bottom-up
368
approach, starting with families, will return America to greatness.
Santorum explains his view of the family through an ancient Kenyan
story. 369 A father gives his children a bunch of sticks and tells them to try
to break the sticks. 3 70 The children easily break each thin stick. 37 1 The
father then hands the children a bunch of sticks tied together in a bundle
and tells the children to try to break them. 3 72 The sticks remain bound
together, unbreakable. 373 Santorum's point is that the family is strongest
when it bands together, giving to each other without regard to individual
interests. 374 Society then builds on the strong foundations of family.
Santorum argues, however, that the family cannot remain strong if the
government constantly intervenes. As Santorum explains, "When [the]
government steps in and imposes a bureaucratic solution based on
individualistic presuppositions, it removes expectations and responsibilities
from smaller social units-especially the family. '' 375 In the context of
grandparent visitation, state intrusion through judicial intervention in family
life hinders parents' ability to carry out their responsibilities, thus
weakening the family. If the family is weakened, and families are the
foundation of America, it follows that America too will suffer as a result. 376
Santorum urges that the government's role is to assist parents in the
education and upbringing of their children, but that this role remains
secondary at all times to that of the parent.3 77 "[P]arents, faults and all,
378
know better than anyone else what is best for their children .... ,,
Santorum does recognize, though, that there are points at which the state
must intervene in the private sphere. For example, he notes that the state
was right to intervene to support the Civil Rights Movement by passing
3 79
various civil rights laws and sending federal troops to enforce such laws.
366. See Santorum, supra note 364, at 9, 67.
367. See id. at 67.
368. See id.; see also Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare
(2002). Like Santorum, Roberts argues that state intrusion weakens the family by damaging
the parent-child relationship, and stresses the importance of strengthening families by
increasing parental rights. However, Roberts argues that race plays a central role in family
policy making, and focusing on the harm of state intrusion alone without looking at racial
harm fails to capture the full picture. See id. at 104-13, 225-28.
369. See Santorum, supra note 364, at 17.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 68-69.
376. Id. at 15.
377. See id. at 356-57.
378. Id. at 357.
379. Id. at 70-71.
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State intervention was absolutely necessary because it was the smallest unit
of society that could make a difference. In other words, families and
smaller, local organizations failed at achieving racial justice. The harm
posed by racial inequality continued, and federal governmental intervention
became necessary to prevent such harm. Santorum recognizes that state
intrusion is justified only in rare circumstances, 380 and the situations he uses
to define rare circumstances all present harm.
Absent such harm, the state should not intervene in the private sphere,
specifically in the decision of a parent to deny visitation to a grandparent.
Santorum believes we must "trust parents to know what's best for their
children," since they "have a much better idea of what their children need
than any impersonal governmental institution." 38 1 The government is to be
the "silent partner, not the managing partner," and "[o]nly rarely" impose
its views. 382 Santorum's view of the family as the buffer from an
overreaching state supports the harm standard in the context of grandparent
visitation rights.
III. THE FATE OF THE HARM STANDARD

Part II discussed the arguments typically made in support of the "best
interests plus" standard and the harm standard. Part III argues for adoption
of the harm standard and predicts that courts will interpret statutory best
interests language to require a showing of harm instead of invalidating such
statutes. Finally, Part III argues that, at the standing stage, states should
require grandparents to show probable cause to believe the child will be
harmed in the absence of visitation.
A. State Legislatures and Courts Should Adopt the Harm Standard
Both sides to this debate agree that the goal is what is in the best interests
of the child. The "best interests plus" standard does not further that goal as
well as the harm standard. The "best interests plus" standard weakens the
parent-child relationship by raising doubt as to the parent's decision-making
abilities, and is more likely to put children through the stress of litigation at
an already vulnerable time. 38 3 The "best interests plus" standard allows the
state to intrude on the parent's fundamental right to direct the care, custody,
and control of his or her child before such intrusion is necessary,
superseding parental judgment with its own simply because it feels it could
The standard is indeterminate,
have made a better decision. 384

380. Santorum notes that parents are the best decision makers "in the vast majority of
cases." Id. at 364. "Only rarely should the government take the role of calling the shots." Id.
at 71.
381. Id. at 364.
382. Id. at 71.

383. See supra notes 355-58 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 259-65, 285-87 and accompanying text.
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unpredictable, and susceptible to social bias.3 85 Such a standard is not in a
child's best interests.
The best way to serve a child's interests is to adopt the harm standard.
The harm standard strengthens the relationship between parents and
children by showing children that they can feel confident in their parents'
decision-making ability and respect their parents' authority. 3 86 Most
importantly, the harm standard protects the parents' fundamental right to
direct the care, custody, and control of children by respecting parental
authority absent a showing of harm. 387 The harm standard denies the state
power to intervene simply because a judge feels that he or she could have
made a better decision, or would simply like to optimize a child's
welfare. 388 Only a finding of harm could legitimize such state intrusion.
The harm standard recognizes the grave responsibilities that parents have
and grants parents the rights necessary to carry out those responsibilities. 389
It is more determinate, more predictable, and more evenhanded in
application than the "best interests plus" standard. 390 The harm standard
strikes the appropriate balance: It grants the protections necessary to
strengthen the parent-child relationship while still deferring to the state
where harm to the child is a danger.
B. Increasingly,States Will Interpret Best Interests Language to Require
Harm
There is a trend in the United States to strengthen parental rights. When
grandparent visitation statutes were first enacted, every state statute
required merely that visitation be in the child's best interests. 3 9 1 None of
the original statutes required additional findings, as the "best interests plus"
standard requires. Certainly, none required a showing of harm. Today,
thirteen states require a showing of harm, and every other state requires
something more than mere best interests of the child. 392 The increase in

states that require harm in the last two decades reflects a growing trend
supporting the protection of parental rights. 393 States are moving towards
requiring harm, not away from it.
Most states that require a showing of harm have done so through court
interpretation. 3 94 State courts have read the harm requirement into current
385. See supra notes 346-50 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 303-08, 320 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 339-50 and accompanying text.
391. See Segal & George, supra note 18, at 11-12 (explaining that all states used some
version of the best interests standard in 1989 (the year of the book's publication)).
392. See supra note 162-63.
393. See Bohl, supra note 60, at 315-19 (discussing the trend towards greater parental
protection through strict substantive and procedural requirements in grandparent visitation
statutes).
394. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
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statutes. 395 Typically, a statute requires only best interests on its face, but
the court "saves" the statute from unconstitutionality under Troxel by
reading further requirements into it. 396 For a number of reasons, courts
prefer to read requirements into statutes rather than strike them down. This
technique comports with principles of statutory construction that urge
397
courts, if possible, to interpret statutes in a way that will uphold them.
This technique is less contentious and draws less public attention to the
matter. Further, it maintains judicial legitimacy since a typically unelected
court is not explicitly overturning law made by elected officials that more
closely represent the people's wishes. 39 8 Saving a statute rather than
striking it down also more closely adheres to the principle of stare decisis,
or let the decision stand. 399 Although reading a new requirement into a
statute is a change in the law, it is not as great a deviation from prior law as
would be a declaration of the entire statute's unconstitutionality. Thus,
states will likely continue the trend of requiring harm before granting
grandparent visitation by reading such a requirement into the relevant
statute, rather than striking down the entire statute.
Finally, it is important to note that five states, Georgia, Michigan,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas, adopted the harm standard through
explicit statutory language. 40 0 This is not the norm, but nonetheless it
shows that support for parental rights does not derive solely from the courts.
These legislatures, elected bodies representing the public's wishes, chose to
increase protection of parental rights through adoption of the harm standard.
The fact that both courts and legislatures are recognizing the strength of a
parent's fundamental right is crucial. It increases the likelihood that more
states will require harm in the future, whether through explicit statutory
adoption or judicial statutory interpretation.
C. States Should Require Grandparentsto Show ProbableCause to Believe
that There Would Be Harm at the Standing Stage
Not only should states require harm to grant grandparent visitation over a
parent's objection, but states should also require that grandparents
demonstrate potential harm in order to gain standing. This means that,
395. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
397. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems."); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895); Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
398. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of

Professor Carter'sApproach to JudicialReview, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 47 (1986) (explaining the
anti-majoritarian problem of unelected judges overturning law).
399. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 115 (2006) ("A longstanding, widespread
practice is not . . . to be lightly brushed aside, and this is particularly so when the
constitutional standard is... amorphous ... ").
400. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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before they could petition the court for visitation rights, grandparents would
have to show probable cause to believe there will be harm to the child
absent visitation. Admittedly, this requirement gives great weight to
parental rights and makes it more difficult for grandparents to seek
visitation. Yet, this requirement is necessary considering the damaging
effects of litigation. As discussed in Part II.B.9 of this Note, grandparent
visitation suits place pressure on the child and tension on the parent-child
relationship. 40 1 A petition for visitation poses too great a threat to the child
and the parent-child relationship to allow it to move forward without some
initial hurdles. If courts allow grandparents to petition without an initial
showing of harm, many grandparents may petition solely to punish the
parents or seek revenge for denying visitation.40 2 Imposition of the harm
standard as a standing requirement weeds out these frivolous suits and
protects the child and the parent-child relationship from their damaging
403
effects.
Joan Catherine Bohl argues that a trend has already begun to increase
40 4
standing requirements for grandparents seeking visitation.
Gone is the virtually automatic presumption of standing, supported by
generalizations and sentimental assumptions; in its place a realistic and
specific assessment of relationships and circumstances. This realistic
assessment reflects the judicial trend towards protecting family autonomy
in the context of grandparent visitation. Indeed, real adherence to
threshold requirements for standing becomes another path towards
405
application of the harm standard in grandparent visitation law ....
However, states will want to make sure that requiring harm to grant
standing is not strict in theory, fatal in fact. 406 The purpose is not to set the
bar so high that no grandparent would ever gain visitation rights. The
purpose is merely to weed out frivolous suits in which grandparents would
not be able to establish any harm at the litigation stage. Accordingly, state
courts should not require' that harm be demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence or be pled with particularity at the standing stage;
those standards are reserved for review of the actual petition. Instead, in

401. See supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
402. See Newman, supra note 295, at 32, 35 (explaining that "harmful or harassing"
grandparents may bring vindictive suits to "indulg[e] their own hostility and generate[] legal
conflict to achieve their own ends").
403. See Bohl, supra note 60, at 320 (arguing that "[s]trict adherence to threshold
limitations on grandparent visitation suits" is necessary to protect family autonomy).
404. See id. at 315-19 (arguing that there is a trend to increase standing requirements and
strictly adhere to them, rather than grant standing leniently based on sentimental
presumptions about the grandparent-grandchild relationship).
405. Id. at 325.
406. This term has been used by the Supreme Court to explain the role of strict scrutiny.
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978). In Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 326-327 (2003), and Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995), the Court explained that strict scrutiny is meant to be strict and searching, but not
always fatal in fact.
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order to gain standing, state courts should require harm be shown by
probable cause or the lesser standard of preponderance of the evidence.
D. What Constitutes Harm Will Change with Time, but the Requirement of
Harm Should Not
Throughout history, the definition of what constitutes harm has changed.
Two hundred years ago, it was acceptable for parents to use harsh physical
discipline to punish their children. Today, those same methods of discipline
are considered child abuse. The standard for what constitutes harm will
continue to change, as it has in the past. Such flexibility allows the
standard to adapt to shifting social norms and reflect the views of current
society. Despite these fluctuations in definition, the requirement of harm
should remain constant.
CONCLUSION

Troxel increased protection of parental rights by requiring deference to
the decisions of fit parents. However, the decision hardly ended the debate
on grandparent visitation rights. The plurality declined to address the most
crucial question: Does a stricter version of the best interests standard
sufficiently protect parental rights, or is the harm standard necessary for
adequate protection? States are beginning to follow the latter approach,
adopting the harm standard through statutory language or judicial
interpretation. The trend toward adopting the harm standard will and
should continue. The harm standard respects parental autonomy and
protects the parent-child relationship from unwarranted state intervention
while ensuring the welfare of children.

